Norman Wild.

AMERICA REVISITED

Photo : Hay Wrightson, New Bond St.

THE RT. HON. EARL OF BIRKENHEAD

America Revisited

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To

MR. JUSTICE DUFF,

of the Supreme Court of the Dominion of Canada,

and to

MR. PAUL D. CRAVATH,

of the Bar of New York,

and Honorary Bencher of Gray's Inn,

This small Book is Dedicated

in much Friendship;

But without committing either of them to any of

the opinions herein expressed.

B.

PREFACE

NEARLY six years ago the duty was imposed upon me, at a critical period of the War, of travelling through the United States for the purposes of War propaganda. I had not on this occasion the leisure necessary to visit the extreme West or the extreme South. But otherwise I was given the opportunity of addressing great audiences of American citizens in almost all the principal centres of population.

The experience was naturally one of extreme interest; but the circumstances were too exceptional to afford a safe basis for any generalization upon Anglo-American relations. For one thing, the atmosphere was too charged with electricity; and even with emotionalism. For consider what had happened. President Wilson had quite evidently formed the opinion almost from the outbreak of war that his was to be the high function of the conciliator. Most clearly he was of the opinion that no occasion would or ought to arise in which the United States would be

engaged as a belligerent. And accordingly he delivered from time to time stately orations in which he absolutely refused to admit any moral distinction between any of the belligerents.

An intelligent student of the world crisis must, if confined for purposes of information to the speeches of President Wilson, and to those speeches alone, have reached the conclusion that the nations of Europe, reacting to the stimulus of insane ambitions, had plunged into a bloody war : and that on the whole, in relation to merits, there was very little to choose between them. The published works of the principal German diplomat at Washington have made it abundantly plain how great was the influence he had established over the mind of the ex-President : how frequent and how friendly were the discussions : and how easy it would have been for him to preserve indefinitely an intimate diplomatic relationship if he had been protected from the maladroit Naval megalomania of the German Admiralty.

President Wilson indeed, evidently believing that war-weariness would in the last resort drive the nations of the world to accept his arbitration :

and detecting in this exalted rôle no contingent rival but His Holiness the Pope: had made up his mind to hold the scales evenly between the two schools of belligerents. And in this easy determination he pictured himself, at some time in the future, in the capacity known to the classical authorities of Roman Law as *vir pietate gravis*, dictating to an admiring world the terms upon which the controversy, which in his view should never have arisen, might be happily composed.

No one who had occasion, as I had, closely to study the diplomatic correspondence which took place, at the critical period, between the United States of America and this country, could doubt that this was the self-conscious object of the policy of the ex-President. He did, it is quite true, address remonstrances to the German Empire, growing with the passage of time continuous and stronger, upon the submarine campaign. But he was always careful to supply judicial equipoise by sending to St. James's very verbose protests upon the subject of the freedom of the seas. And an extremely attentive observation of all the diplomatic correspondence for which the ex-President was responsible makes it impossible to

contend that, before the moment when, by a precarious majority, he was re-elected President, he had deflected his bias in the slightest degree more upon one side than upon the other in this controversy. In other words, until the period which I have adopted as crucial, he had not afforded any real indication that he regarded the morality of one side of the combatants as in any way distinguishable from the morality of that of the other. And, indeed, the issue upon which he deliberately allowed his lieutenants to present his Presidential campaign showed how indeterminate, even at that date, were his conclusions upon matters which were surely not lacking in the materials for a definite judgment. The slogan of the campaign in the critical electioneering States was prescribed by authority: "He kept us out of the War."

And then quite suddenly there came a culmination of outrage, insult, and contempt, issuing from Berlin, which no great, proud and powerful nation could support. The battery, in other words, before which France had recoiled in impotent protest for twenty years, was directed upon Washington. Outrages were officially planned to

destroy American factories which were doing exactly what German factories had done in the Russo-Japanese war. Innocent merchantmen flying the American Flag, and plainly identified in other ways as American vessels, were sunk by German submarines. Finally a clumsy German diplomatic intrigue was disclosed which had as its purpose to enlist disturbed Mexico, by the side of Germany, to meet the contingency of a rupture with the United States. This series of sinister events finally disturbed the equipoise of President Wilson.

In a noble, even if slightly belated phrase, he cried: "The challenge is to all mankind. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves cut to the very root of human life."

The observation is not perhaps unreasonable that this conclusion, so vividly expressed, was the same which had driven a pacifist British Cabinet in August, 1914, to precisely the same conclusion. So pacifist, indeed, was that Cabinet that three Ministers resigned because they were not prepared to undertake any responsibility for the war. And it might even be added that the data necessary to the conclusion reached by England had

not been very obviously multiplied between the two periods.

But a critical examination of the mental attitude of the American Government in the intervening period; and of the decisive character of the various agencies of enlightenment which changed that attitude; do not very specially belong to this place, although they may hereafter be made the subject of useful examination.

It is, however, very relevant to my present purpose to recall the enthusiasm with which this great and resourceful people flung themselves into the task of war, when once they were permitted to do so by their leaders. And I had the good fortune to visit the country soon after the signal had been given from the White House to let loose the dogs of war. An unforgettable impression was produced upon my mind by the superb and massive effort which I saw everywhere in progress before my eyes. We left a Europe, the political morale of which had almost everywhere been impaired, whose finances were shattered, and whose man-power was gradually failing before the bloody demands of the far-flung trenches. We came to a puissant and populous

Empire; intact in strength; immensely reinforced, by neutral trade, in material wealth; and zealous to contribute a white heat of moral enthusiasm which was the more formidable because it had been pent up so long.

It was in such an atmosphere that I was privileged, on the invitation of the American Government, and as a Minister of the British Government, to make the acquaintance, at this critical and deeply interesting time, of hundreds of thousands of American citizens. Never shall I forget the enthusiasm of those days; never the affectionate and devoted friendship of those many Americans who were flinging everything into the common cause. It is indeed unlikely that in our lifetimes, or perhaps in the lifetimes of our children, any occasion will happen so apt to bring together American and British hearts. British officers were everywhere assisting to train American battalions: American ships of war were co-operating with British ships at Queenstown; now under the command of a British Admiral, now under the command of an American Admiral. And suddenly Washington completely forgot about the freedom of the seas: for I can state

with considerable personal knowledge (I was Attorney-General at the time and responsible for the Crown cases in Prize) that the activities of the united fleets upon the relevant matters were not very obviously distinguishable from the earlier activities of the British Fleet.

It is indeed an unprofitable and a slightly ignoble question: Who won the War? For all who co-operated in that glorious victory were perhaps necessary for its attainment. But no competent witness can deny the supreme contribution which the American nation made, even at a late period, when the energies, the man-power, and the material resources of the veteran combatants were flagging and declining. For this at least was certain of the American people, that however slow they might be in entering upon a quarrel, when once involved therein they were capable of exhibiting a doggedness, and a tenacity, second to that of no people in history. And though I have read, I think, almost all the great books which have appeared on the subject of the War; I do not think that full justice has ever been done to the effect produced by the American intervention upon the morale of our enemies.

The German nation, though docile, disciplined, and in some respects even servile; was nevertheless both educated and intelligent. And naturally an Army which was the Nation (if one eliminates the old men) reflected both the intelligence and the education. The Army knew perfectly well that if there were half a million American troops in Europe in January; there would be a million and a half in June; three millions next January; and perhaps in a year six millions. And they knew, too, that behind those millions, vigilant and resolute, were arrayed the material wealth, and the industrial genius, of the wealthiest and one of the most virile nations of the world.

And so it happened just at that moment of all others, when the fortunes of the German Armies required the equal maintenance of military and civilian morale, that the morale of both was dissipated and destroyed. For the civilians and the soldiers alike realized that the quarrel had become hopeless; and that the longer it was prolonged, the more prodigious would the ultimate humiliation prove.

The submarine gamble was the most daring

which any nation has ever undertaken in the throes of a desperate war. It was undertaken in the belief that it would produce decisive results before the United States could make themselves effectively felt in the war.

This calculation failed.

The arrogance of the German Admiralty was corrected by British doggedness; and America so effectively and so swiftly entered into the war that the courage and stamina of the great German Empire withered before her victorious incursion.

It would have been unreasonable, on a visit paid at a moment of unavoidable war reaction and disillusionment, to hope that one might recapture all the spirit of the old days. There exists in America to-day a great and general apprehension that the country may still be entangled in European politics. And this apprehension is strengthened by the unfavourable view which most Americans have adopted of the present tendency of those politics. In the first place, they are naturally not well informed as to the *nuances* of the latest European developments. They see around them little evidence of European resettlement: everywhere they hear of wars and

rumours of wars; they see no promise of a fresh dawn: and in the gloom which perhaps precedes the dawn they congratulate themselves once more that they rejected the rosy and glowing visions of President Wilson.

But this attitude, which I believe to be true of the nation taken as a whole—though it is rash to generalize upon what a nation so far-flung and so cosmopolitan as America is thinking—is consistent with a very sincere spirit of friendship to this country. The extent of that friendship must not be exaggerated. The United States have been reinforced from many fountains of emigration who draw little from the England of Elizabeth and Shakespeare. For the first time last year in the New York Directory the patronym of Cohen displaced the Smiths from an age-long supremacy. To the present writer a sigh may perhaps be conceded.

To many millions in the United States it is still hardly a recommendation to a visitor that he should be an Englishman. Those facts should all be noted in cool perspective. Yet it should equally be remembered how warm-hearted, how generous and how sentimental

in the best sense the American people is. And it must be remembered, too, that millions of the most enlightened citizens in this great Republic consistently exhibited in the face of every difficulty a warm and generous friendship for Great Britain; never ceasing in the critical days of the War to affirm their clear view of the moral responsibility of the United States; and that they have ever since rendered a generous measure of recognition of the superb effort which Great Britain has by general admission made in and since the War.

And so as I pass by way of Preface to some of the speeches delivered in the United States or in Canada which I here reprint, many grateful memories throng my mind; of old and new American friends; of kindly and warm-hearted hospitality. Nor do I, though not by temperament over-sanguine, exclude the hope that year by year and decade by decade these two great peoples, resembling each other so closely in their general outlook upon the major problems of civilization and humanity, will still re-create in its fullness the generous friendship which was the happy fruit of an unhappy War.

Preface

All the speeches reprinted in this volume were delivered either in the United States or in the Dominion of Canada, except my Rectorial Address before the University of Glasgow. I include it in the volume because it correlates and somewhat expands the point of view which pervades the American speeches. It was stupidly, and ignorantly, assailed principally by Bishops who had studied it in headlines. Strangely enough, it was never criticized upon its weakest side; namely, that it contributed little to the volume of ascertained and established truth.

BIRKENHEAD.

March, 1924.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
1.	The United States To-Day	1
2.	The Problem of Prohibition	49
3.	The Canada of To-Day	77
4.	Problems Left by the Great War	103
5.	Constitutionalism in Great Britain and in the United States	135
6.	On International Law	159
7.	Idealism in International Politics	177
	Index	203

AMERICA REVISITED

CHAPTER I

THE UNITED STATES TO-DAY

I

MATERIAL PROSPERITY

EACH time that I visit the United States I am conscious of an enormous advance in the material prosperity of this illimitable country. But I confess that on the present occasion the impression was deeper than ever before. Everywhere I went I saw cities developing with incredible rapidity. Everywhere factories are being extended. Everywhere great public buildings, conceived upon a scale of nobler architecture, are coming into existence. And the United States are evolving a special quality of architecture which does not, any the less, owe something to the American type, because it is founded, in its essential features, upon Greek conceptions. I am not here speak-

ing, of course, of the skyscrapers of New York. These are indeed among the wonders of the world. And those who conceived them are entitled to take a high place among the architects of the world. For they devised something altogether original, extremely difficult, and at the same time quite indispensable if the majestic and variegated life of New York was to continue on a site so narrow and so congested. And they have dealt with a problem which no other nation has had occasion to approach, with a scheme of inventiveness which, however bizarre, possesses a character and a genius of its own. No one who upon a summer evening has approached these towering edifices, over-topping the lower clouds in their tall beauty, can fail to realize an almost magic city; peopled indeed by the eager searchers after wealth and surrounded for some space by mean streets; but nevertheless a splendid emblem of the aspiring greatness of this immense Republic.

The architecture of the larger cities is matched by the public spirit and munificence of the wealthy citizens of this country. One great

University after another is enriched by the munificence of private benefactions. The University of Chicago is modelled architecturally with mimetic fidelity upon the noblest buildings of Oxford and Cambridge. Here is to be found an almost exact replica of the great Hall of Christ Church, unfavourably distinguished only by the portraits which are ranged upon its walls. Nor is it alone in the great centres of wealth like Chicago that an admirable sense of civic responsibility, operating upon immense wealth, has produced illustrious universities. In the States it is almost universally realized that the accumulation of wealth upon a large scale involves, and renders natural, a bestowal of some portion of it upon generous public purposes.

In Great Britain, in spite of our comparative poverty, we are still able to note with admiration many evidences of the same spirit. But the creation within so short a period of time of so many provincial Universities, has unquestionably congealed the fountain of private munificence in relation to our greatest Universities, Oxford and Cambridge. Here the rich stream

of mediæval endowment has failed, and the two most illustrious Universities in the world have been forced, not without great peril to their essential character, to look to public resources.

Twenty-five years ago the average American man of business was conceived of, and not altogether with injustice, as one who left home early and returned late, employing the long day in the feverish interests of Wall Street; he became dyspeptic at forty; and he very often died at fifty. In the interval (if he were successful) he accumulated a vast fortune. His wife and his beautiful daughters enjoyed it; but, as far as he was concerned, the rare alleviations of a hectic life coincided with a few hurried visits to Europe.

I never was quite able to realize what such a man derived from life commensurate with the exertions that he made. The Psalmist, after all, said that the life of man was three score years and ten. Persons gifted with exceptional constitutions have, very readily, and agreeably to themselves, prolonged this period. There is, for instance, still living in the United States of

America, an old lady aged 126; and she gave a tea-party on the occasion of her last birthday. At such an age it might very reasonably be assumed, and in a prohibitionist country, that a tea-party on such an anniversary is a very enjoyable occasion. But not to reason from an extreme case, the late Lord Halsbury learned to ride a bicycle at the age of 80, and to play golf at the age of 82. I do not know whether he rode the bicycle well or badly; though the evidence is overwhelming that he played golf very badly; but in any event he undoubtedly enjoyed both.

I have never myself been able to understand the philosophy of life of the men who, unless they dislike life, overdraw their accounts at the only vital bank that really matters. After all, however much wealth one has, it is as certain as anything can be that at the last dreadful moment it must be left behind. Charon's fare may be as readily paid by the pauper as by the prince; indeed, there is every reason for believing that in the last resort you may be ferried over that cold stream without any obol at all.

I think that there is a great change in this

respect in the outlook upon life entertained by most successful business men since I first visited America nearly thirty years ago. And oddly enough, the modest instrument which in my judgment has done most to promote this change has been the game of golf. When I first knew America I should doubt (though I do not know) whether there were more than twelve golf courses in the whole of the United States. The late Mr. Gladstone was once, much against his wishes, compelled to play golf. He is reported to have commented upon the experiment that it was a good walk spoiled. Such would undoubtedly have been the verdict thirty years ago of any 95 per cent. of the whole male population of the United States of America. But to-day the pervasive influence of Scotland has conquered America as completely as Lord North failed to conquer it. I suppose there are about three times as many first-class golf courses in the United States of America as in any country in the world. And more and more I observe signs that the successful business men of the United States are allowing themselves this and other relaxations

from their daily excitements. More and more they seem to me in this respect to be attaining to a sane and equable philosophy of life.

I am not anxious in a sketch which is not intended to be controversial, except in one or two minor particulars, to involve myself in the great Protectionist controversy. I merely therefore note this fact: that it is evidently impossible to predicate of Protection that it is destructive of the economic fortunes of the nation which embraces its doctrines. For the prosperity of the United States is exuberant and phenomenal; and yet on my repeated visits to that country it so happens that I have never met a prominent business man who was a Free Trader. I have certainly met some men who thought that, in some respect or other, their tariff might be modified or altered. But I greatly doubt whether it would be possible to find among those who really count in the United States a dozen men who accept for their guidance the teachings of Cobden. I am well aware that it may be retorted (and I have often made public admissions of this fact) that the astounding natural resources of the United States

of America make it impossible to derive from their experience maxims valuable for the guidance of communities whose economic conditions are so little comparable. But I note these circumstances, which I believe to be indisputable, merely in order to make it plain that the assumption that Free Trade is the best policy for all countries, at every stage in their development, is one that cannot be sustained. For the proposition that the whole business world of the United States of America is so blind to its own economic interests as not to know whether Free Trade or Protection serves its interests best, is a paradox too wild to deserve, or require, disputation. In my mind, the requirements of the domestic market in the United States of America will for a long period of time, perhaps for twenty or thirty years, keep their factories in busy employment. There is so much wealth in the country; so much expansion and development; such self-confidence; that I see little prospect in the near future of any dependence on a large scale upon export markets for manufactured goods. And therefore I cannot myself see any prospect in the near

future that the United States will be driven, upon trading and industrial grounds, to the conclusion that their own material interests demand a risky intervention into European politics.

The agricultural situation appears to me from the American standpoint to be more anxious. In this field America does at present require, and it may be will, for a considerable time, continue to require, the relief of foreign markets. And such markets will not upon a paying basis emerge until Europe and the world emerge from the aftermath of the War. There is unquestionably great discontent among the farmers of the United States. And this discontent may easily react fatally upon the fortunes of either of the great American political parties. For the agricultural population of America is extremely numerous, and politically not ill-organized. The difficulty of the Government in attempting to attract it politically is that it has nothing to offer which the farmers value. And so it happens, paradoxically enough, that the problem which we have to confront in this country, where we have unhappily sacrificed agriculture, is the same problem which

must confront the Government at Washington, which cannot sacrifice it for years, and perhaps not for generations.

In my judgment the political considerations which alone might induce the United States to take a more active and more responsible part in contributing to the problems of Europe, are those which will or might arise from agricultural pressure in the field of politics.

To sum up my conclusions upon this branch of the subject. The material advancement of the United States is stupendous. I can assign no limits to it. Not even the embarrassing possession of nearly all the gold of all the world is impeding or clogging the wheel of progress. Midas is at last becoming prosperous in spite of his gold. I do not think that American economists and financiers have succeeded in exploiting to the full the extraordinary world opportunities which the post-war situation placed within their grasp; the explanation of this is, in my judgment, to be found in the fact that, with all their shrewdness, they lack something of the sophistication and age-long sagacity of Threadneedle

Street. But no system of Protection will hold this people back from their onward advance in the race of ever-growing prosperity. They will or may intervene in European politics (a topic to be hereafter examined in this chapter) when they judge it in their interest so to do; but the only great field of national industry which affords a prospect that this conception may procure adoption, is to be found in the precarious situation of the great national business of agriculture.

2

THE NEGRO PROBLEM

This problem is admitted by most enlightened men in the United States of America to present one of the gravest which confronts their future. And indeed it is both historically strange and politically formidable. The white migration into this rich and unpeopled continent wore down, in days long since past, the softness of the indigenous Indian. And having done so, it was driven, having regard to the scanty numbers of the available white population, to call in aid a servile re-inforcement. And so resulted the slave

trade. A new, virile, ineffaceable and very remarkable population became gradually established upon the American continent. It brought with it for a long time, in servile conditions, very extraordinary qualities. It was superficially adaptable; it was physically immensely strong, resistant and resilient; and, what was to be even more important, it was attended by immense procreative fecundity. The problem, though difficult, was not unmanageable as long as the moral ideals of the United States tolerated the existence, in its midst, of a servile class. How long it could have been tolerated; how far it was ever tolerable, must be left to the historians of the United States to determine.

If any such to-day survive, those who still vindicate the cause of the South may at least be permitted to make the claim that, whatever concessions it was necessary to make in terms of morality in excuse of their own system, they at least perfectly appreciated the practical and social problems which must follow upon a substituted and more idealized conception.

To-day the United States appear to be con-

fronted by this problem: that industrial and social conditions are more and more tempting the negro population of the South to migrate northwards. The South had methods, right or wrong, which enabled it even after the abolition of slavery, to cope with its negro problem. I am not at all satisfied that the North, to whom this problem is novel, has either assimilated its realities, or marshalled its idealities, or indeed prepared itself in any way to deal with the social consequences of its invasion. Almost like a horde of locusts the negroes of the South are invading city after city of the rich and undiscriminating North. A whole area of Chicago—and not a disreputable one—fifteen years ago inhabited exclusively by a white population, has now been handed over in undisputed possession to the dark invader. And a large dealer in real estate who has spent his life carrying on that business in Chicago informed me that he could at present discern no limit to the invasion or to the encroachments involved in it over the adjacent tenements and streets of Chicago.

No one who has travelled much in the United

States of America will ever speak unfavourably of the coloured population, taken as a whole. It has indeed many amiable, admirable and attractive qualities. All such travellers have in their minds grateful recollections of the friendly and courteous service, the unaffected cheerfulness, of the coloured attendants in railway cars. But the clear appreciation of the many attractive qualities of this obliging and friendly people cannot blind one to the unbridgeable wall which the inscrutable purposes of Nature has placed between them and their white neighbours; and to the gravity and prominence of the problem which exists and must continue, when a strain so fecund, so virile, and so unassimilable, coexists on a continent, however vast, side by side with a white civilization, which in many of these respects, however superior in others, cannot support its competition.

3

AMERICA AND EUROPE

Upon this disputable subject it is necessary to write with reserve and to avoid generalizations.

For opinion in the United States upon the present political situation in Europe is fluid; and, if one may be allowed a homely expression, "streaky." A large section of opinion unquestionably distrusts what it looks upon as French aggressiveness; and does not even hesitate to allege that one menace to the peace of Europe has been succeeded by another hardly less formidable. Others, on the contrary, take the view that ever since the Treaty Germany has systematically been avoiding her financial obligations thereunder; partly by deliberate deflation, partly by the wholesale transfer of securities to the United States and to other parts of the world. This school of thought holds that no method, except such a one as that of M. Poincaré, could bring the Germans to their senses: that Mr. Lloyd George was sentimental and ineffective in this matter: and that nothing but the iron hand would effectively secure such liquidation of German indebtedness as is actually practicable. I am inclined to think that these schools of thought would be equally balanced in the States were it not that the airy indifference of France in the

matter of her indebtedness—a subject to which I shall hereafter refer more fully—had greatly prejudiced the general French position in the United States.

It is, however, possible to make certain broad statements with some confidence. In the first place, the citizens of the United States are now, as always, ready to support with generous warmth, upon however large a scale, private charities in relief of the sufferings of Europe. And indeed in this matter their noble exertions in Russia, and their continued efforts to assist the victims of Turkish misrule, fill shining pages in the history of international philanthropy. Nor, indeed, can any apparent limit be assigned to the readiness of this generous and wealthy people to contribute, in the field of private charities, to the necessities of a stricken world.

But it must in the second place be made quite plain that Americans as a whole look upon the continued instability of European conditions with uneasiness, with distrust, and not without the attribution of a good deal of blame. The disordered conditions which they see existing every-

where in Europe lead them, in my judgment, more and more to congratulate themselves upon the immense National majority which repudiated the policy of President Wilson.

Here we touch at once the very heart of the American attitude. President Wilson undertook responsibilities, and made commitments, the like of which no former President of the United States had ever attempted. He pledged the support of the United States of America to a League of Nations which possessed some measure of super-sovereignty. He did this without the slightest real indication that the American nation was behind him in this attempt; and with many striking danger-signals that it was not.

When I visited the United States in 1918 I incurred much censure by emphasizing in an Address delivered to the New York Bar Association, and afterwards reprinted in " My American Visit," the reasons which led me very greatly to doubt whether the American nation ever would, or indeed ever ought to, accept the League of Nations in the shape conceived by President Wilson. I was immediately assailed by the

shrill idealists of two continents. I was told (quite untruthfully) that I was attacking President Wilson and his policy. I was told that I was an unimaginative materialist; and that I had done more harm by this one speech than good (if any) by all the other speeches I delivered in the United States of America. I can afford to dwell with some complacency upon this incident; for so far as I am aware, I was the only Englishman holding any public position who quite plainly discerned from the first that there was not the slightest prospect that the United States, when consulted, would accept the League of Nations.

I made this speech very deliberately, and after careful preparation; for I was very anxious to direct the attention of the people of America to the implications which were involved in the proposals of the President. For even then I saw quite plainly what an unfortunate situation would result if the President involved the world in a Treaty which the Senate refused to ratify. I did not attack—I never have attacked—the general conceptions which underlie the scheme of the League of Nations. But I analysed with

great care some of the more patent difficulties from the American point of view; and asked plainly, and with some intentional cruelty, whether this was the kind of League which American opinion was prepared to accept. I may add that I was completely undismayed by the stream of criticism which an address, the prescience of which has since been admitted by nearly all the leading papers of the United States of America, elicited among the sentimentalists of that day. And naturally I have never blamed the United States of America for rejecting these proposals the moment an opportunity for pronouncing upon them was afforded to the general body of citizens. But at the same time I must carefully guard myself from the criticism that I exonerate the people of America from a grave measure of responsibility for our present misfortunes. They are not themselves, for the reasons I have given, blameful for having rejected the Treaty of Versailles. In rejecting that Treaty they acted within the undoubted rights of a free people legally and even ethically. Had I myself possessed a vote in America I should certainly

have recorded it against President Wilson. Their responsibility springs from quite another source; and it is a very deep one. They are the authors of their Constitution; responsible for it; and to be judged by international misfortunes which are caused by its imperfections.

Under that Constitution the President of the United States of America was legally empowered to go to Europe as the representative of the American people; armed with prestige, power, and rank to which no other negotiator could lay claim. For the President of the United States of America is during the period of his office armed with prerogative powers wielded by no potentate or minister in the world to-day. It is idle to say that Europe had plain warnings of the rumblings of discontent already audible in his own country. It was absolutely impossible to ask that they should make themselves the judges of future political developments in America. They were not only entitled—they were bound—to accept President Wilson as the authoritative exponent of American views and American wishes. A whisper even, which could

have been construed as disrespectful, to this great man in the very zenith of his career would have been generally and rightly resented all over the States. We must throw our minds back. This was the period of victorious intoxication. It was the day of the triumphant processions in London, in Paris, and in Rome. Europe had no choice but to accept the workings and the implications of the American Constitution. And however vivid may have been the apprehensions from time to time entertained by those who negotiated with President Wilson (and they were very vivid) upon the ultimate outcome, they could not, without risk of causing the gravest offence in America, treat him in any capacity except that of an exalted plenipotentiary.

And so the long-drawn drama was played out. The United States were pledged to become a member of the League of Nations, and to all the obligations which membership involved. They were equally pledged, jointly with Great Britain, to the Pact of mutual defence for the protection of France. Looking back, it is easy to see now how wholly alien both these obligations or sets

of obligations were to the traditional foreign policy of the United States. I choose once again to recall that I pointed this out at the time. But the confidence expressed by the President, in language so sonorous and so splendid, influenced even the most sceptical of his colleagues. And even those who still doubted realized the impossibility and even the indecency of challenging his credentials.

It is not possible even now to judge how many of the misfortunes of Europe were directly due to this tragic and irrational optimism. The League of Nations has ever since been truncated. The Pact of Protection influenced and deflected much of the policy of Clemenceau; so that no one could state with confidence how far the whole Ruhr complication was produced by conditions which would never have arisen had the French been permitted to explore avenues which they reluctantly abandoned in exchange for the Pact. This and this alone is the claim which Europe has upon American help. It is a very real claim. But I did not myself think it useful in the speeches which I delivered in the United States,

and some of which are reprinted in this volume, to make appeals *in misericordiam* founded upon general claims of sentiment. The American nation is very just. The claims founded upon the considerations which I have just examined are unanswerable. It is to the more general realization of these indisputable truths in America that we must look as the best hope of American national co-operation.

But we should be blinding our eyes to very evident facts if we did not recognize that the general policy of the United States is, as clearly as it has ever been, one of non-intervention in European affairs, except in so far as unquestioned American interests render such intervention imperative. And the very impracticability of President Wilson's proposals; and the political hurricane which submerged them, have made it infinitely more difficult for a reversal of that decision to be attempted by any political party. The subject has become one of the great historic contentions between parties which sometimes find it a little difficult to raise clear and intelligibly defined issues. I see no sign that the Democratic

Party has the slightest intention of compromising its electioneering prospects by any real reversion to the proposals of President Wilson. And the Republican Party which won so remarkable a victory upon this issue, is showing considerable nervousness, even in relation to the proposed International Court, modest as that proposal seems to those who formerly ranged themselves for and against schemes so grandiose.

My conclusion, therefore, upon this branch of the subject is that the proposals of President Wilson and any comparable proposals have been not only decisively, but for all time, rejected by the American people. That people will never adhere to any League of Nations which imposes upon them not merely the degree, but even the kind, of responsibility which the President recommended. Nor will it ever pledge itself to any international undertaking resembling in the slightest degree the Pacts of Protection which President Wilson believed himself authorized to offer to France.

The United States will, in other words, continue to pursue their traditional policy. That

policy is founded upon the conviction that the first duty of a nation is to its own nationals; that peace is better than war; that the geographical aloofness of the United States of America affords the Government of that country exceptional opportunities of protecting its citizens from the horrors of war; and that it is the duty of every American Government to mitigate the risks of international complications in every situation which does not directly menace a primary American interest.

But this people is as conscientious as it is cool in measuring the extent of any of its national responsibilities, and I am certain that there exists already a great body of opinion, likely to become stronger rather than weaker, which in virtue of the considerations which I have attempted to urge, will more and more insist that the United States does labour under a great responsibility to Europe; and ought to contribute to its salvage by any methods which do not conflict with the principle of foreign policy which they regard as axiomatic.

4

AMERICA AND GREAT BRITAIN

This branch of the subject again requires to be examined with care, and treated with delicacy. For here, too, generalizations are extremely misleading. It would be altogether wrong to underrate the appeal which British descent makes to a great section of the American people. In that strange amalgam of confluent populations, which has not yet made, though it will one day make, a homogeneous people, a certain satisfaction and even a certain pride is felt, not only by those millions whose teeming ancestors sailed in the *Mayflower;* but also by those whose grandfathers or fathers have left in the last hundred years Liverpool or Birmingham or Manchester, to seek new fortunes in a new world. And so in my travels in the States I was frequently touched by the numbers of those who came to me claiming that their grandfather was a Birkenhead man, or that their grandmother had been a Somersetshire girl.

We must not, therefore, ignore, though we

must be careful not to exaggerate, the effect in America of an ancestry which those who possess it greatly, and rightly, value. Why indeed should we or anyone else be guilty of the affectation of pretending that it is not a distinction to be sprung from the loins of these tiny islands, which for nearly a thousand years have flung their intellectual and political influence into the furthest corners of all that world which was known to each generation of its countrymen?

But it is none the less true that every sentimental appeal has its reactions. None of the other European powers which have largely contributed to the population of the United States has in American eyes the unfortunate historical record of the British people. The disastrous effects produced by King George III and Lord North are even now (incredible as it may appear) hardly exhausted. Indeed, much of the sympathy of the United States with Ireland sprang from a vague conviction that Ireland had for centuries been treated much as Lord North tried to treat the American Colonies. The influence of historical textbooks in the public schools of America has

frequently in this connexion been explained. Their authors talk much and quite justifiably of Lord North and the King. They give less prominence to the noble and generous eloquence of Lord Chatham and Mr. Burke.

The folly of which those were guilty who were at that time unhappily in control of the destinies of Great Britain ought not to blind our eyes to the fact that even in that tragic quarrel there were two sides. The main burden of the defence of the American Colonies, so far as those Colonies were menaced—as they constantly were—by European powers, fell upon Great Britain. It was unquestionably right that they should make some contribution to an Imperial expenditure without which they must incontestably have fallen the victims of a European power which would certainly not have treated them better than Great Britain. But the difficulty was that the Colonies never could agree, and never would agree, upon the proportion which they ought to pay. "No representation, no taxation," has a noble sound; but the consequences are less noble when you really mean that you do not

desire representation, and cannot agree among yourselves to contribute anything to the taxation. This nevertheless was the historical truth of the crisis which produced the struggle for independence.

These considerations do not of course involve any defence of the tactless blundering, and unstatesmanlike handling of the situation, by the British Government. A larger vision, more sympathetic imagination, and more generous patience, would undoubtedly have afforded the means of an accommodation with men who at that time were almost all of our own blood; were in the main reasonable and capable of compromise; and who certainly did not desire to carry an unhappy quarrel to extremities. But the controversy is now so old; and it has become so completely a matter for the historian, that an Englishman is entitled, if only in self-defence, to pray in aid of the complete and repeatedly expressed inability of the Colonies to agree either upon the formula or substance of their contribution to the Imperial expenditure. Almost everyone at that time blundered. We blundered most of all. The

most unfortunate element in ancient historical quarrels is that among peoples of tenacious memories their consequences last so long. And it would in my judgment be a mistake even to-day to imagine that this age-long bitterness has exhausted its capacity for mischief.

But it must at the same time be realized that there is much in our temperament, our civilization and our history, which is deeply admired in the United States. Our general outlook upon the politics of the world, and upon the greatest problems of contemporary humanity, is the same. We each have so much of the world that neither wants any more. The deepest interests of both countries require peace and tranquillity. Neither is in any circumstances capable of an aggressive war. In both countries there exist noble humanitarian forces which Imperial Germany never could have understood, and which no statesman or military caste could ever control, inflexibly opposed to bloodshed, if bloodshed can be avoided without disloyalty to national safety and national existence. And it may therefore be proudly claimed that however powerful at a given

moment may be the forces which cherish no special liking for Great Britain, there will always be found, in balanced equipoise, great sections of the population which either from heredity, or from political or intellectual sympathy, earnestly desire to maintain friendly and even cordial relations with this country.

This subject cannot be dismissed without noticing the numerical strength with which the present population of the United States has been recruited from non-English origins by an enormous infusion of Irish, German, Italian, French, Scandinavian and other elements.

This makes it plain how obsolete is the talk that blood is thicker than water. Indeed, without incurring the charge of snobbishness we may perhaps make it plain that we have little claim to pose as the cousins of that great family which, as I have already pointed out, enjoys to-day the hegemony in the New York Directory.

The conditions of our friendship with the United States of America may be summarized rather in a different way:

Many of their citizens have inherited our

blood and share the traditions of the England of Shakespeare and Milton. Many others are in broad agreement with our outlook upon world affairs. Almost all educated Americans, whether our friends or not, have a generous admiration for the history, achievement and traditions of a country so small; of which the population during that achievement has been relatively so inconsiderable. But these, and these alone, are the considerations which we must treat as actual, and, as ever in human affairs, that which is actual is, on the whole, more important than that which is sentimental.

5

THE UNITED STATES AND IRELAND

The greatest triumph which British statesmanship has achieved during the last hundred years in its diplomatic relations with the United States is unquestionably to be found in the Irish Settlement. The emigration from Ireland to America during the last hundred years has been astounding in its exuberance. And nearly all that emigration has proceeded, not from the

North, but from the South. The result has been that 90 per cent. of Irish emigration to America has consisted of the bitterest enemies of this country. The Irishman has many qualities, some very attractive; some less attractive. But no one has ever disputed that if he inherits a quarrel which passionately engages his feelings, he will transmit it more tenaciously from father to son than any islander has ever succeeded in doing since the happiest days of Corsica. And by universal consent, Irishmen possess, if not the highest form of political cleverness, at least political adaptability and resources of a very unusual character.

Thus it came about for many years that a powerful section of the population of the United States of America, capable of discipline, willing to undertake the labours without which successful political organization is impossible, was bitterly and irreconcilably opposed to the interests of Great Britain. And being ourselves human and not altogether inexperienced in politics, we must take note of the reactions of this state of affairs upon American politics. The Irish vote, perfectly

organized, never vacillating, sure of itself, became at recurrent intervals of great and even of decisive importance in American politics. It followed that those who, in these Islands, desired a warm and friendly relationship with America, found themselves in this difficult situation, that a great, active, and very vocal section in American political life was utterly irreconcilable, and would vote for any party which encouraged them to ventilate grievances ancient and bitter, but by no means always unjust, against Great Britain.

We were often exhorted in old days by true American friends to set our house in order. Our advisors had not always studied the strange and tragic history of Ireland. Had that country been a single and homogeneous community, no difficulty could or would have arisen. But unhappily for its solution, our ancestors, hundreds of years ago, had as a matter of deliberate, and not unnecessarily unwise, policy planted Scotch and English settlers in the North of Ireland. For hundreds of years these men had afforded an equipoise, relied upon by an unbroken series of

British Governments, against repeated attempts in the direction of secession. They preserved their dour and individual character as jealously as did the wholly different population of the South.

The differences between the two populations were intensified by religious cleavages which were tenacious, fanatical and almost mediæval. It was as certain as anything in the world has ever been certain that the attempt compulsorily to place the North of Ireland under the South, as numerically they must have been in a Parliament sitting at Dublin, would have produced a bloody civil war. Home Rule, therefore, as presented by Mr. Gladstone and his successors was impracticable, and never could have succeeded, because it drew no distinction between the evidently separable conditions of the North and of the South.

I admit most fully that I myself proceeded with Lord Carson to great lengths—and would even have proceeded to greater—in order to prevent the forcible inclusion of the Northern provinces in a Parliament sitting at Dublin. But it is not necessary to attempt a lengthy argument

for the justification of that which was then said and done. For four successive Prime Ministers —Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Baldwin—have concurred in the view which we then formed, and which was the justification of our actions, that Ulster could never be coerced, even if she might ultimately be persuaded, to become part of a larger Irish polity. And it may be added with some confidence, that it is extremely unlikely that the fifth Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, will take a different view.

It is therefore sufficient for us in our justification to make it plain that that against which we contended is now universally admitted to have been wrong and impracticable; it is not disputed that if actually attempted it would have led to civil war; we, on our part, are content to state our case in the terms that an extreme measure of resistance in speech, and even in act, may be justified in the case of those who were resisting a policy now universally admitted to have been unfair, impracticable and certainly productive of civil war.

But it was hardly reasonable to expect that the subtler sides of this controversy should have been completely understood in the United States, where indeed all the missionary talk was upon one side. And therefore it happened that for fifty or sixty years the relations between this country and America were embittered by an open sore. Many complaints were made in 1914 of the slowness of the United States in appreciating the ethical aspects of the Allied cause. To those who understand politics it may have appeared almost a sufficient explanation (though there were others) that the Irish population in the United States of America amounted to not less than 4,000,000 persons born in Ireland and their children, and that the German population, in a similar category, in the United States amounted to over 7,000,000. The figures for the population of Irish and German extraction are not available, but if one considers the continuous absorption of immigrants of both these races during the last century some idea of their relative racial influence may be apprehended. He was indeed an optimist who expected that the culti-

vated opinion of the West; the generous friendship of those who still felt themselves to be of our kin; could sweep away within a short period of time forces at once so powerful and so impervious alike to reason and to sentiment.

The first glimmer of hope in this matter was disclosed when there succeeded here at home to the campaign of destruction and assassination the hope of a settlement by conference. Nor in the early stages was the hope either considerable, or generally entertained, by those who took part in that conference. But as its discussion proceeded, it became plain that Ireland was represented by two remarkable though very widely different men.

I had myself gone into the conference without any real hope that it could be brought to a successful conclusion. But the personalities of Mr. Arthur Griffith and Mr. Mike Collins gradually and almost insensibly altered my view; and so, painfully, uncertainly, doubtfully, we groped our way to a solution which I believe beyond doubt will be pronounced by history to be the greatest effort of statecraft in the whole history of the

relations first between Great Britain and Ireland; and secondly between Great Britain and the United States.

Of this, at least, I satisfied myself by constant inquiry in almost every centre of population in America which I visited. There is no longer an Irish Party which is important so long as it depends upon any Irish grievances. As between President Cosgrave and Mr. de Valera, the latter is almost without an adherent. You cannot in any great city in the United States collect a representative audience of American citizens to recreate the Irish issue. And if here and there you find sporadically distributed in the cities where the Irish cause was once so strong an adherent of de Valera, you will always find that such a one has all his life been an implacable enemy of Great Britain; and that rather than abandon this pleasurable habit of mind, he is content to become the follower even of a de Valera.

The settlement of this ancient controversy which we happily attained and which the energy and courage of President Cosgrave and his

friends is daily making more successful, has done more to remove controversy and the risk of it between the United States and this country than any other single cause except their sacred association in the Great War.

My summary upon this part of my examination is that the kindness and generosity and hospitality of American hosts to British guests is greater than ever it was; that no international difference has developed, or as far as I can see is likely to develop, between the two countries in the near future; and that the most bitter, awkward and durable cause of discord has been removed by the Great Irish Settlement.

6

THE SOCIAL LIFE OF AMERICA TO-DAY

The observations which I have to make upon this attractive subject must be carefully separated from those which I shall have to offer in a separate chapter under the heading of "Prohibition." The two topics are indeed, as may be supposed, not unrelated; but different considerations arise,

and I find it on the whole more convenient to deal with the two topics separately.

It cannot be doubted that for rich people America is one of the most delightful countries in the world in which to live. The climate is indeed over a large extent of its surface harsh and extreme; but so great is the extent of that surface that those who can afford the means of locomotion can always vary their climate at any period of the year. Such travelling activities are not of course within the range of all. But nevertheless an extraordinary proportion of the amenities of life is open to, and is enjoyed by, the working classes.

A significant illustration of this fact may be given. There are more motor-cars in the State of New York than there are in the whole world apart from that State. Six out of ten working men own either a Ford or some kind of a "Flyvver." I myself saw a great building in process of construction in the environments of Chicago around which sixty-eight small motor-cars were waiting to carry sixty-eight artisans home after their day's work. There is conse-

quently no jealousy in the United States based upon the possession of motor-cars as being a special privilege of the rich.

But the immense accumulation of cars in the hands of the whole population is producing a traffic problem to which the most experienced minds in the United States see no answer. In fact, one of the greatest authorities in New York told me that, while many disagreed with him, he was himself convinced that the New York problem would never be manageable until they had constructed over the busy parts of the city a complete duplicated overhead system of roads. I cross-examined him as to the mammoth cost that would be involved in such a scheme. His estimate exceeded even my expectations. But he nevertheless assured me on the authority of one of the greatest transport experts in New York City, that it was, in his judgment, inevitable that such an enterprise must come.

The problem in Chicago was hardly less striking. A great merchant in that city who lived in the suburbs told me that he always left his car three miles from his office and took his chance

of a street car or a taxicab. Of all the social changes which I observed in the United States after five years' absence, the immense development in the number of automobiles was incomparably the most striking.

With this stupendous growth in material prosperity which has taken place in ten years there has been afforded everywhere greater opportunity of indulging those generous and hospitable impulses which Englishmen have always recorded of their visits to the States. If a visitor is liked he will be passed on his travels from one delightful companion to another with a letter which makes it unnecessary to seek other friends in that particular city.

And at last, as I have already pointed out, the United States are beginning to realize that life is short, health vital, dollars incapable of transfer to the next world, and that therefore there is much to be said for a reasonable enjoyment of life in this. And so on the Eastern coast all sections of society have carried lawn tennis to a scale of general practice which seems likely to retain for long the Championship of

the world. No self-respecting "burgh," in the same spirit, counts itself anything at all unless it has established a golf-course and a professional (generally a Scotsman), both of whom are just a little better than those of its nearest rival.

On the life of its great Universities, some of which I had the opportunity of visiting, I cannot speak without deep admiration. The spirit and the *esprit de corps* are as great as in any known to us. And even though it sound egotistic to make the claim, I must as an Englishman be allowed to say that their athletic associations have captured and retain all that is best of our public school traditions.

I have been often asked whether in my widely-spread travels I detected many fundamental differences between West, Middle West and East. A stranger is never especially sensitive to such differences. I found in all the great cities charming, cultivated and kindly people. I did further discover, not without amusement, that there was a general resentment in the Middle West against the portraiture of their lives which is contained in Mr. Sinclair Lewis' clever books.

I forget now and am writing without books of reference, but I believe that seven Greek cities compete for the honour of having given birth to the great Homer. I am able confidently to state that at least seventy "burghs" are contending that they have nothing to do with either Main Street or Tibbets Town.

I have already suggested that it is impossible to discuss with any completeness the contemporary social life of the United States without a careful and analytical study of the effect of Prohibition upon that life, and to that task, with the caution becoming to a stranger, I shall address myself in the next chapter.

THE PROBLEM OF PROHIBITION

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF PROHIBITION

THE importance and the vividness of the controversy which Prohibition excites in the United States to-day is imperfectly exhibited even in their Press. I was on my recent visit for nearly three months in the United States. I can hardly recall one single meal in which the topic of Prohibition was successfully avoided. No account, however superficial and fugitive, of a visit to America would be complete without an attempt to examine and collate the results of the most interesting social experiment which any country in the world, still calling itself free, has ever made. Five years ago, observing movements and tendencies, I wrote in " My American Visit " the following sentence :

> " The forces deploying for this great social antagonism are not unequally matched. It will be interesting to study the final result of their collision."

Since then, Prohibition has gained its victory in the United States, has conquered territory which it has since proved unable to hold in the Dominion of Canada, and has afforded a sufficient period of time for analysis and criticism.

The attack upon alcohol was of course one of the most remarkable that any country has ever attempted. This drug has been used in one form or another almost from the twilight of the human race. Its effects were no doubt unfavourably illustrated on more than one occasion in the Old Testament. And names even as respectable as those of Noah and King David may be without unreasonableness, thanks to the care and frankness of the Old Testament chroniclers, enlisted on behalf of a teetotal argument.

The plain truth appears to be that alcohol used in moderation is a very agreeable addition to the amenities of life. I still remember the late Lord Halsbury at a dinner which I gave when Lord Chancellor, to the Judges of Belgium, drinking two glasses of champagne and a glass of port, in his 97th year. It is equally true that the abuse of alcohol has through the ages en-

couraged vice, promoted crime, and induced the ruin, moral and physical, of weak persons. But it is quite certain that the controversy will continue, because it is founded upon fundamental disparities of temperament in human nature. There will always be those who will sing with Fitzgerald:

> Oh, fill the cup:—what boots it to repeat
> How time is slipping underneath our feet:
> Unborn to-morrow, and dead yesterday,
> Why fret about them if to-day be sweet!

There will always be those who, if assailed by scriptural argument, will recall that the Psalmist indulgently spoke of "wine that makes glad the heart of man"; and that Our Lord, after all, turned water into wine. This particular miracle has always seemed to me to make it impossible to found any Prohibitionist movement upon a religious basis. For the very slight allusions I have made to two deplorable cases of excess in the Old Testament make it certain that at the moment when a divine miracle deliberately converted water into wine, the perils, the improprieties and even the indecencies which are apt to

accompany alcoholic excess were almost as clearly appreciated as they are to-day.

Those who found themselves upon the literal or actual inspiration either of the New Testament or of the Old in these matters must, if they be candid, admit that the argument requires to be founded upon modern considerations of expediency rather than upon eternal principles of right.

The historical development of Prohibition in the United States requires some slight examination. There have for a long period of time been "dry" States, particularly in the South, but the drought was humanely, considerately, and scientifically conceived in the interests of the negro population. There was, it is true, a considerable body of opinion in the United States which over a long period of time struggled in the interests of compulsory teetotalism. But studying as carefully as I can the results of these efforts and expressing my opinion with the hesitation proper to a stranger, I cannot reach the conclusion that until the war these movements had made great progress or were within reach of success. The

conditions produced by the war in the United States of America were remarkable. The very fact that the United States came late into a war, of which, when once it was embraced, they realized, and expressed in eloquent terms, the moral justice, led perhaps to a higher degree of sentimentalism than was observable in any other of the self-governing Allies. The Prohibition Party in America was astute to observe the gains which might be made by a cause hitherto unsuccessful if it was founded upon an appeal which was so congruous with the earnest patriotism of the moment. And accordingly it was put forward everywhere, where patriotic Americans met, that the evils of alcohol were clogging and impeding the national effort. And this argument was, I am told, very powerfully put forward by many who made no specially noticeable contribution to the national effort.

But even so, making full allowance for the extent to which the sentiment of the country could be exploited by a patriotic, even if an illogical appeal, I doubt greatly whether the campaign would have succeeded if two quite

different sets of conditions had not converged to forward its career.

In the first place, the condition and character of the saloons in the great cities of America were on the whole one of the great scandals of the world. Every responsible American was thoroughly ashamed of them. And yet they were extremely powerful when merely confronted by local, municipal, or even by State, assault. It seemed to many—politics being what they are—that no movement short of a national movement could possibly destroy the saloons. And it appeared to many reasonable men that if there were no other way of smashing the saloons except that of national prohibition, it might almost be worth while to run the risk of employing this particular dynamite.

And in the second place it must be carefully noticed that the temperance movement in the United States never attained practical results, and probably, in spite of the sentimentalism induced by the War, never would have attained practical results, if it had not been reinforced by a powerful impetus proceeding from the great

employers of labour. In other words, the movement, so long as it was a moral movement, never attained to any great measure of success. The War increased the sentimental forces behind it. And when the financiers and the capitalists, in the interests of the efficiency of labour, threw their influence upon the same side, the combination so aggregated became the most formidable which any country has ever enlisted in the cause of Prohibition.

The methods of the reformers, and their tactics, were extremely ingenious. They were adopted with an exact knowledge of the rigid quality which appertains to the Constitution and to its authorized amendments. And the change so made, prodigious in its consequences, as yet incalculable in its reactions, can only be disturbed by a combination of chances and opportunities of the reverse kind which is extremely unlikely to occur.

It is evident that two questions require an honest and informed answer before one can reach even a provisional conclusion upon this most difficult problem.

(1) Has it on the whole succeeded in attaining its professed object, namely, that of stamping out the sale, distribution, transportation, and consumption of alcoholic liquor?

(2) If it has not so succeeded, what are the consequences of that failure: and what inferences are to be drawn from that failure in relation to the moral aim attempted?

Let me attempt to examine in general terms the answer which must, I think, be made almost without risk of controversy, to the first of these questions. It must be made in general terms because a grateful guest, entertained by kind hosts under difficult circumstances, may be excused for the employment of some slight reticence. But this may be plainly said by me—because it is everywhere plainly said in the United States—that this is a law which plainly operates in favour of the rich, and plainly operates against the poor. It is, I think, on the whole true that the working classes of the United States do better work under Prohibition than they did before. Larger numbers of them return to work

on Monday morning. Such an arrangement is doubtless admirable from the point of view of an employer of labour, who had his own cellar laid down upon a munificent scale in the days before Prohibition; and who has nothing to lose and everything to gain by the enforced sobriety of his employees. But while I am not disposed to dispute the solid gain which has accrued to industrial efficiency from Prohibition; even here a sombre and different picture must be drawn. It is not given to all men, even to working men, to withdraw themselves absolutely from the attraction of alcohol, just as it is not given to all rich men. And even during the short time in which I was in the United States, I read of thirty-four different cases in which poor men, who had no cellars, had perished by drinking poisoned alcohol. So great indeed was the alarm that was created by these repeated and most tragic casualties, that in many towns semi-public agencies for determining the purity of substances submitted to them had been enormously expanded in order to deal with the submission for test and certification of alcohol illegally obtained,

or illegally manufactured, which the consumer would not accept until it was vouched by the Public Analyst. And this analysis, be it observed, was conducted with notoriety and in circumstances which made it indisputable that the increased activity was both understood and approved.

I apply myself now to the broad question: Has or has not Prohibition expelled alcohol from the United States? The answer is notorious. It unquestionably has not. It is quite true that there are many small towns; and many more villages, where it is impossible to obtain alcohol. But in my journeys through the towns, where I always in a spirit of social curiosity asked the question, I was invariably informed that Prohibition was not very strictly enforced there; but that if you went to another town (whose name was obligingly given) you would there find that its full enforcement was effective. A practical commentary upon the success of the United States authorities in excluding alcohol is to be found in the fact that the best Scotch whisky was only 6d. a bottle dearer in New York than in Mon-

treal. And this was not supplied through dangerous channels, but by a most respected bootlegger who to my knowledge belonged to at least one fairly good Club in New York.

The real truth is that when you have a population of nearly one hundred millions; of whom at least some millions desire to enjoy a form of refreshment which is exhilarating, and which many people have enjoyed since the dawn of the world; when that country has thousands of miles of boundary, from the Dominion of Canada in the North to Mexico in the South; when it is additionally handicapped by having I know not how many thousand miles of maritime access; when the trade is profitable beyond the dreams of avarice; no Government, however resolute, however wealthy, however equipped, could ever enforce such an exclusion. Spasmodic efforts are from time to time made. Meetings of Governors are convened. Perhaps all the Governors are not unanimous. The police force of a great city is completely and publicly purged. But nothing very effective is done. Nor indeed could anything very effective be conceived. New York

State has already formally withdrawn its own very great resources from any attempt to enforce the law of Prohibition. I am told that other States are contemplating, or have already adopted, similar action. To employ the Federal strength in these State quarrels would impose a burden upon the Federal authorities which even to the resources of America would be formidable.

Nor must it be assumed that the fundamental difficulties in the enforcement of Prohibition proceed entirely from the difficulties of intercepting smuggled alcohol. The very resources of Nature are enlisted against him who would dry up the gifts of Nature. A chemist can produce alcohol by boring a small hole in a ripe apple and exposing it to the sun's rays for a sufficient period. Home-brewed beers of excellent quality—for I have tasted them—are common on the farms of the Middle West; though I think that on the whole the labourers drink less of them than the farmers do. Apple-jack, a potent liqueur stronger than old brandy, is a common object of rural production.

But the most singular illustration of all is

furnished by the case of California. When it became known that Prohibition was certain to succeed, a most disastrous slump immediately occurred in the vineyards of California. These were quoted and sold at about 40 per cent. less than their pre-war values. And indeed everybody assumed that in the austere régime which was to reform American life these vineyards had exhausted alike their moral and material utility. But what has happened since? The same lands are being sold to-day—and not for the purposes of growing grain—at a higher price than they were sold for in the year before Prohibition became a law of the land. There is no reason to suppose that the American appetite for grapes as such has greatly increased in the interval. The plain and universally admitted truth is that the Californian grapes are being distributed all over the continent for the purposes of private wine presses. And I myself met five different American citizens of the highest position and respectability—men of whom any country might be proud—who told me that they imported grapes from California and wine-makers from Italy, in

order that at their respective ages they might not be compelled to depart, by what they regarded as an intolerant tyranny, from life-long habits.

I summarize therefore the answer to the first question which I have proposed by saying: (1) That nearly every very rich man in the United States has a pre-Prohibition cellar which will last him for many years. The possession, it is true, is an anxious one, for it is almost invariably protected by armed guards at night. (2) That no poor man has such a cellar. (3) That the rich man can reinforce his supply because he can afford to pay an absolutely reliable bootlegger. (4) That the poor man, if he decides to drink, must take terrible risks, because the kind of bootlegger open to him is less expensive and less discriminating. (5) That apart from bootlegging and smuggling, the consumption of alcohol upon an immense scale takes place in the United States of America. (6) It naturally happens that the proceeds of that consumption enure almost entirely to those who have the wit to contrive it and the resources to establish it. (7) That no one who is careful, prudent and equipped with

money need fail to obtain reliable alcohol at a comparatively reasonable price in any great city in the United States of America to-day.

It remains now to consider the second question which I proposed, viz., what are the consequences of the failure at present universally admitted: and what inferences are to be drawn from that failure in relation to the moral aim attempted? Although the failure is almost universally conceded, it must not therefore be assumed that in the peculiar circumstances which exist in the United States the Prohibition Act will be repealed. Nothing appears to me less likely. It is indeed true that there exists a considerable movement in favour of allowing the consumption of light wines and beers. Such a change is no doubt recommended, to those who advocate it, by the fact that it could be effected by a modification in the Schedule of the Volstadt Act, without undertaking the almost impossible task of amending, in the cumbrous method which alone is possible, the Constitution. But I do not think that even this slight modification is likely to be attempted. In the first place, no political

party quite dares to embark on the deep waters of controversy on each side of which so many powerful and immeasurable forces are ranged. I have, for instance, little doubt that the overwhelming majority of American women is opposed to any modification of the existing law. Such an admission does not, of course, conclude the matter; for I have never been prepared to admit that a majority of women ought to be allowed to impose, or could indeed in the long run succeed in imposing, their views upon a powerful minority of unconvinced men. But at the same time I am concerned with the political prospects. And it appears to me that neither of the great Parties in the States is prepared to jeopardize its prospects, without greater assurance than is at present available, that on balance it would gain more than it lost by embracing the cause of modification or repeal. Such a time may come. It has not come yet.

And in the second place I do not expect to see the smaller mitigation of the present austere system adopted for another reason. The relief would no doubt be considerable. It would

diminish unquestionably the numbers of those who resolutely and openly break the existing Law. It would not end, or even much diminish, the existing scandals of smuggling and bootlegging. For that which to-day is imported by these methods is neither beer nor light wine. Both beer and light wine are, as I have shown, manufactured upon a considerable scale already. And both are too bulky to be the profitable subject matter of bootlegging. The plain fact is that in the United States, as in every civilized country in the world, millions of citizens desire to drink spirits. They resent absolutely a law which in their opinion is a gross usurpation upon the domain of private conscience. And they have not the slightest intention of acquiescing in the present system, or of abating any of the rights which they would enjoy, if they were citizens either of Great Britain or of France. It seems to me for these reasons unlikely that any Party powerful enough to afford the promise of success will propose to render legal the sale of beer and light wines. If there were any prospect that such a modification would end the problems and the

scandals of the existing system, the matter might possibly, perhaps certainly, require a different decision. But there is no such prospect; and I adhere to the opinion above expressed.

It is proper now to examine the larger question: What is the prospect that Prohibition will *in toto* be repealed, and that the United States will now, or hereafter, regain in this respect the social freedom which is enjoyed by every country in the world?

We cannot of course reason from the experience of the Dominion of Canada. That country indeed succumbed, except where the sturdy commonsense of the French population of Quebec proved an obstacle too strong for conquest by the wave of emotionalism which swept over the United States. But it has been changing its mind ever since, and has given in nearly every province practical expression to these changes. Indeed, the comfortable material advantages afforded to a population, where alcohol can be obtained, by contiguity over a boundary of thousands of miles, with an infinite and thirsty population, where it cannot be procured, have pro-

duced the result which any reasonable man would have expected. Montreal, for instance, has become a very favourite place for long week-end visits by citizens of the United States. And the experience of Montreal is being repeated on a smaller scale in every Canadian centre, urban or rural, which affords the prospect of a pleasurable and refreshing visit. I have already attempted to make it plain that the decisive causes which fastened Prohibition upon the United States were not moral, but economic and commercial. It is ironical to discover that the causes which are leading to its failure in the Dominion are equally not moral but economic and financial.

The system which prevails in most parts of the Dominion is that of sale by the Government. Wine indeed, including champagne and beer, can be obtained at any restaurant or hotel. Spirits can only be obtained at a Government shop. Only one bottle is allowed upon a single visit. But the visitor, if his need be great, is permitted to repeat his visit with the same fruitful consequence. So that if a man wants six bottles of whisky he must send his servant six times to the

Government shop. The method is perhaps a little more clumsy, but the result ultimately obtained is not very distinguishable from the easy system to which we are accustomed at home.

So much money has been made in the Dominion of Canada, directly and indirectly, as the result of Prohibition in the States, that financial conditions, in the only great Province which still remains dry, are imperiously suggesting a change in the present law. I am inclined to believe that almost by the time these words appear in print it will be found that the whole of the Dominion of Canada has recoiled from this bizarre experiment.

But it is not so easy for the United States of America to recoil. Their Constitution, as is made plain in a speech which I reprint later in this volume, cannot so easily be modified. Prohibition has become a part of the Constitutional Law of the United States and has accordingly taken its place in that adamant, cast-iron surrounding in which so many artificial obstacles are opposed to the path of the reformer. The arguments hitherto employed in dealing with the suggested

legitimation of the sale of light wines and beer apply *a fortiori* to a change infinitely more difficult to bring about, and certain to attract a more violent and widely-spread antagonism. And the political difficulties, already great, are enormously increased by a very singular circumstance. Reference has already been made in this chapter to that new American industry—bootlegging. The resources of that industry, its ingenuity, its ramifications, its influence and its organization, are little if at all understood in this country; I doubt even whether they are completely appreciated in the United States. And for the first time in the history of any country the whole influence of the drink trade—now an illegitimate, not a legitimate, trade—is thrown upon the side of fanatical teetotalism. I was indeed informed, and upon credible authority, that many bootleggers' cheques, decorously masked, of course, help to swell the funds of Prohibition. Could a situation more savagely ironical be conceived? A system was imposed upon vast numbers of American citizens—whether a majority or a minority matters in this connexion not at all—which

they repel as tyrannous. The drink trade, discerning as they believe in these proposals the knell of doom, resisted them, but vainly, in all its organized strength. The result is that the drink trade is to-day enthroned in greater strength and hardly less wealth than before, though its activities have been driven to illegitimate and subterranean channels. And just because the profits of this trade are so stupendous those who carry it on prefer the existing system, with all its risks, to the doubtful chance of reversion to the old practice. And for this reason they are the most formidable, if they are the most silent, allies of Prohibition in the United States of America.

It remains to be asked what inferences ought to be drawn from a failure which I have attempted to establish, and shall hereafter venture to assume, in the moral aims attempted.

I have already made it plain that there exist some country districts and some unsophisticated towns in which the difficulty of obtaining alcohol has no doubt effectively ended the alcohol habit. In such places it is no doubt true that the new

generation will grow up screened, as long as it dwells where it was born, from a penetrating temptation, which strong men have generally resisted, but before which weaklings have frequently succumbed. It may be conceded that this gain—so far as it is a gain—may be set plainly upon one side of the account. And let it equally be conceded that an inference of greater sobriety among the working classes may be drawn from the fuller attendance which the wages sheets in industrial concerns disclose on Monday mornings. Let it be admitted further that the Savings Bank deposits have increased in the period under consideration (although indeed the growing prosperity of the whole country affords in itself no small explanation of such an increase). But when all these admissions are made, there remains a powerful number of overwhelming considerations upon the other side.

The American nation has in the main always been admirably law-abiding. The framers of their Constitution and their High Judges perceived with unswerving clearness of vision that respect for law is the very foundation of civiliza-

tion. And a nation cannot respect the law in streaks. For it is one majestic whole. Its reputation; its binding force; the reverence which citizens entertain for it; depend, not upon one out of the thousand angular aspects : they depend and always will depend upon the general recognition that "*It is the Law; and because it is, the Law must be obeyed.*" You can no more attempt reverence for the law as a whole, while segregating one department from that whole as foolish, indefensible and therefore violable, than you can say of a citizen that he is a man of the most admirable moral character, but that he unfortunately suffers from occasional homicidal impulses.

Those who forced Prohibition upon the American people did it with the full knowledge that millions of their fellow-countrymen would repel it as a tyrannous injustice. What is the consequence? In every large city the law is openly violated. Citizens of the highest consequence, who have never violated any other law, openly and even smilingly admit that they recognize no obligation under this law. Many restau-

rants in large cities place alcohol upon their tables with the same openness as is to be observed at the Carlton Restaurant in London. Men and women of the highest position openly use the expression " my Bootlegger." It is indeed a notorious fact that the exports of Scotch whisky from one great English house to the United States of America have actually increased since the adoption of Prohibition.

Surely the results so far as they have up to the present emerged from this experiment justify the conclusion that where one is dealing with self-relating actions, the only moral conquests which are either valuable or attainable are those which are imposed upon conscience through conviction; and that a law which intolerantly imposes upon adult citizens an abstinence which they dislike, by prescriptions which they consider tyrannous, can never effect a permanent improvement in human morals.

THE CANADA OF TO-DAY

CHAPTER III

THE CANADA OF TO-DAY

IT is a long established and kindly custom of the American Bar Association to invite each year an English Judge, or an eminent member of the English Bar, to deliver an address on some legal or quasi-legal subject at their Annual Meeting. The guest is entertained with the generosity and completeness which the American nation so thoroughly understands. I myself was met in New York by Mr. Paul D. Cravath, of the America Bar, who took our party at once into a private car, the manifold comforts of which we never relinquished till we reached Montreal.

By a custom equally convenient and pleasant, it is the habit of the Canadian Bar Association to invite the same guest, after his American speech, to address its Members upon some other subject. A memorable precedent is being set in the present year, by which the British and Canadian Bars, acting as joint hosts, are entertaining

in London some eight hundred members of the American Bar. The occasion is not only social but formal: for the American Bar Association, after dealing upon American soil with its purely domestic problems, will actually resume its session for the purposes of public legal discussion in London. The lawyers of London, barristers and solicitors alike, will therefore be afforded the opportunity of showing, by the exchange of willing hospitality, that those of their members who have been the guests of American lawyers across the ocean have failed neither to realize nor to recount the warmth of their welcome.

And indeed the conception is one to strike the coldest imagination. Centuries after the *Mayflower* sailed, the flower of the American Bar, realizing *Melius est petere fontes quam sectari rivulos*, revisits, as valued guests, the historic origins of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.

In the Dominion we received kindness as distinguished as in the United States. The generosity of Sir Henry Thornton, Chairman of the Canadian National Line, placed at our disposal a splendid car for the whole journey from

Montreal to Vancouver. And the late Lord Shaughnessy kindly allowed the car, which made the outward journey upon the National Company's line, to return—varying the scenery—by the Canadian Pacific.

This was the first time I had travelled farther West than Winnipeg; the opportunity therefore of seeing this vast country almost from seaboard to seaboard was specially valuable. I addressed in every large city which I visited one or more meetings upon subjects of Imperial interest. I was naturally thrown into contact with many leading men in the Dominion, and I had therefore some opportunity of learning their views upon the general conditions, economic and political, which prevail in Canada to-day.

My last visit had been paid in 1918, when Canada was as intensely absorbed in her war effort as we at home. And equally, of course, the high emotion of those terrible days had disappeared, and, as is intelligible, the less sophisticated community has suffered less in mental and material reaction, than our older civilization. Indeed, the superficial observer might travel over

a considerable distance in the Dominion without even discovering that it had recently played a triumphant part, involving the loss of thousands of lives, in the great World War.

I think that, on the whole, optimism prevails in relation to the business future. Generalizations are always difficult, but of all those interested in commerce with whom I discussed the matter, I only record one or two pessimists. And, indeed, gloom of long duration is difficult to reconcile with the possession of a land of such incalculable promise. It is worth making the journey if only to see, league after league, the immense grain-fields of the Middle West. And the mineral wealth of Canada will certainly not contribute less to her ultimate resources. For it is hardly an exaggeration to say, taking the Dominion as a whole, that even in likely areas the surface, in relation to that stupendous whole, has hardly yet been scratched.

Indeed, Canada possesses enormous resources of coal; large deposits of low-grade iron ores; and almost certainly a great potential wealth in oil. In nickel, asbestos, cobalt, gold,

silver, copper, lead and zinc, the Dominion has been or is likely to become one of the largest exporters in the world. And equally in the output of chromite, feldspar, graphite, gypsum, mica, magnesite, pyrites and talc, Canada has a yield and a promise which hardly any country in the world can rival. A significant evidence of the importance of the mining industry is to be found in the fact that to that industry belongs over 35 per cent. of the tonnage carried by Canadian railways.

Another source of Canadian wealth little understood abroad, and perhaps imperfectly appreciated even at home, is to be found in her commercial fisheries. Two of the great sea fishing areas of the world border on Canada. And even more surprising—the lakes and rivers of the Dominion constitute almost one-half of the fresh water of the globe. The Atlantic coast line from Labrador to the boundary between the United States and Canada measures over 5,000 miles. It includes the Bay of Fundy, 8,000 square miles in area; the Gulf of St. Lawrence, nearly 80,000 square miles, and other waters

which make the total area almost exactly 200,000 square miles. On the far side of the continent, the Pacific coast line is over 7,000 miles long, and the fresh water lakes of the interior flow over an area of 220,000 square miles. The share of Canada in the Great Lakes along the United States boundary amounts to 34,000 square miles.

The total annual yield of edible fishes of all kinds, which in 1918 (I have no later return) reached the record sum of 760,000,000, leaves Canada third among the fishing countries of the world: Great Britain still being first, and the United States second.

The resources of this impressive country are therefore as immense as they are manifold. Patience and imagination must indeed march hand in hand in order to develop the bountiful inheritance which at present is in the hands of so few.

But of the superb future—ultimately as stupendous as that of the United States—there is no doubt. And the facts upon which this prediction is cautiously founded should be known to every Englishman.

I noticed much development in the field of

manufacture. And here was observable a curious sidelight upon the effect of the British tariff upon motor-cars. This duty admitted of reduction in favour of Dominion exporters. American manufacturers, feeling the pinch of the tax, and anxious to obtain the advantage of the Canadian reduction, have established numerous large automobile factories in the Dominion, employing thousands of Canadian workmen and making no small contribution to Canadian rates and taxes.

A considerable, if less dependable, source of revenue in the Dominion at this moment has its origin in that system of Prohibition in the United States which I have already analysed in a separate chapter. It is plainly impossible to prevent smuggling over a boundary thousands of miles long. To stop it effectively would require the employment of almost the whole adult male population of the United States. It is unquestionable that, directly and indirectly, the American sumptuary law has brought enormous sums into the Dominion. It need not be insisted how profitable is the mere business of smuggling, which proceeds all the time, by road and lake, by

day and night, with such general impunity as to suggest the existence of a friendly sympathy on each side of the boundary line. But smuggling does not exhaust the matter. Very great benefits to Canadian holiday and pleasure resorts in town and country alike have resulted from the contrast between the social laws of the two countries. The number of travellers, for instance, in the far West, in the Rocky Mountains, and other picturesque touring grounds, has undergone great increase : while in Montreal, the swift erection of a third enormous hotel is to be explained in some small measure by the swelling numbers of American visitors.

The present population of Canada is nine millions. One hears sometimes impatient criticism of the comparative slowness with which, as it is supposed, that total grows. And yet, if one selects a relative and comparable period in the history of the United States, it will be found that the growth of the Dominion has rivalled in swiftness that of her gigantic neighbour. And the signs of a rapid and marvellous expansion are everywhere observable. There is first the

rude clearing: then a pathetic and rudimentary "Main Street," with perhaps a tiny Church and a versatile store. Return in two to three years, and you find that there is already developed a small and prosperous townlet.

I often recalled, as I took note of development since my last visit, the eloquent words of Burke when an earlier empire was at the hazard:

> "Whether I put the numbers too high or too low is a matter of little moment. Such is the strength with which the population shoots in that part of the world that, set the numbers as high as we will, whilst the dispute continues, the exaggeration ends. Whilst we are discussing any given magnitude, they are grown to it. Whilst we spend our time in deliberating on the mode of governing 2,000,000 we shall find we have more millions to manage. Your children do not grow faster from infancy to manhood than they spread from families to communities, and from villages to nations."

It is, however, unquestionably true that a more rapid development of her numbers would

bring to the Dominion a swift and very great accession of prosperity and wealth. The population is only nine millions : the national equipment would almost carry twenty. Nor are the housing difficulties which would be occasioned by a great increase comparable to those which beset an older civilization. For in spite of reckless fire wastage, the forest resources of Canada are still incalculably great : and the standard houses of the countryside, as also in the poorer districts of the cities, are invariably wood. This kind of house seems to me to present many advantages. It is durable. It is warm. It is capable of swift erection : and as some of the exquisite New England architecture remains to teach us, it admits of a quaint and picturesque beauty of its own. I have indeed often wondered that Dr. Addison did not substitute an experiment in wood for some of his own less satisfactory conceptions. The housing problem, then, will not arise in any serious form; the great problem, therefore, before the Dominion statesmen is to attract to their country, in sufficient numbers, settlers of the right kind. It ought not to exhaust their contrivance and ours

to correlate the difficulties of these islands, which spring in no small measure from over-population, with those of the Dominion, many of which arise conversely from under-population. These matters were made the subject of much discussion at the recent Colonial Conference, and might with advantage be examined again by the leaders of the Socialist Party, who have hitherto brought little enlightenment to the subject of emigration. One thing is essential. A strong central committee of British and Canadian experts, with branches both at home and in the Dominion, must make it their business to see that the right kind of emigrant is sent to the right kind of place. The most pressing need, of course, is for trained agricultural labourers; but for capable artisans, properly advised, the means of a comfortable subsistence is assured. The benefits which would follow a great increase in the British elements of the population are obvious and manifold. Of the political side I will speak later; but it is evident upon a purely business consideration that the development of the population and resources of the Dominion would very greatly increase the

Canadian market for British products, so that our problems of congestion would find relief at both ends.

I found in the country a certain amount of anxiety caused by the great recent increases in the American tariff. For evident reasons Canada neither hopes nor aspires to establish a very effective competition in manufactured goods upon the other side of the frontier. But there are many staple articles which she could, and gladly would, export if the tariff afforded her any reasonable prospect of penetrating into the American market. In the main it does not do so, and the realization is now general that the United States have hardened into an unshakable conviction, based upon principle, that a rigid system of protection is consonant with, and even required by, the national interest. Business opinion in the Dominion is fully alive to this circumstance, and there is, I think, a general desire to examine with sympathy all reasoned proposals which aim at increasing the general total of inter-imperial trade.

In this connexion the additional preference

proposals, which those present at the last Imperial Conference undertook to recommend to their various constituents, excited a warm interest in Canada. While I am satisfied that the withdrawal of these proposals, following upon the change of government, would produce a disappointment equally keen, I cannot detect any tendency to make really bitter complaint if any single parliament declined to ratify these proposals, while I found everywhere a mild surprise at what Canadians in their hearts consider the tenacious pedantry of our adherence to a one-sided system of free imports.

I found equally a complete recognition that the selection of the economic system which suits us best is a matter which British statesmen are bound to consider in exclusive reference to British interests as they see them. But side by side with this recognition, and a little qualifying its completeness, exists the view, widely held, though always of course courteously expressed, that British interests must be interpreted with a larger rather than a parochial vision.

The dream of an Empire almost self-sup-

porting, because it produces in one territory or another almost everything which human existence and even human luxury requires; of an Empire wherein the component elements retain each and all (for this is elementary) their fiscal independence: but in which each and all are prepared to make some concessions to other members of the family for the Imperial conception: this dream, I am sure, has influenced and will continue to influence the ablest business men and statesmen in Canada. How far its realization has been permanently affected by the recent unhappy election in this country, it is not at the moment possible to predict. But it has been greatly compromised and certainly postponed.

A general tariff, without which really effective mutual preferences are not practicable, has been hissed off the stage, not indeed because the play was a bad one, but because some of the performers did not know their parts; and because the audience had come to the theatre, on a too sudden invitation, not knowing what the play was about. In the result the only great party which really believed in Protection has been

driven—it had no choice—to remove this cause from its proximate programme.

The formula now is that the reform is incapable of attainment except as the fruit of an almost general agreement. The prospect may well strike our friends in Canada and Australia as gloomy. It is, however, when all the necessary admissions are made, less gloomy than it sounds. For just as the Conservative Party is the only party which believes in Protection as a faith, so the Liberal Party, here as always out of date, is the only party which believes in Free Trade as a faith. The Socialist Party is not only upon this subject open to conviction. It is bound to be convinced. Every consideration of logic; every compulsion of consistency must lead it in the wide field of international economics to pursue the road which, and which alone, in domestic matters has supplied them with a thread of homogeneous principle. And when that moment comes at last, the dwindling forces of Liberalism (if indeed any still survive) will be found still mumbling incantations before a dead effigy in an abandoned shrine.

In this connexion it is worth analysing very briefly the imports into Canada from the United Kingdom during some of the years from 1897 to 1922. It will be remembered that the British preference was approved by the Canadian Government on the 1st August, 1898, and did not become completely effective until during the year 1899. In 1897, the total imports under consideration amounted to $29,000,000 (for simplicity I give the figures in terms of millions), of which $9,000,000 was free. In 1900 the total increased to $44,000,000, of which $12,000,000 was free; in 1910, $95,000,000, of which $23,000,000 was free; in 1920 the total was $126,000,000, of which $33,000,000 was free. The total for 1921 was, however, remarkable, amounting as it did to imports of the total value of $213,000,000, of which $40,000,000 was free. The corresponding figures for the year 1922 were: total imports, $117,000,000; free imports, $21,000,000. In the last ten years the rough average of the total imports has been $115,000,000, and the rough average of the free imports $28,000,000.

These figures speak for themselves, and make

it plain how enormous is the present value of the existing Canadian preference to the working men of this country; and even more conspicuously, how great is the total value to these islands of the whole Canadian trade.

The moral which ought to be drawn from these remarkable figures is surely plain enough. Everywhere in Europe we see stagnation, uncertainty and decay. Nowhere else in the world, except in our own Dominions, can we hope to find markets in substitution for those which we have lost, either permanently or for a long time, as a result of the War. While it is not claimed that in any proximate period of time Empire markets, old or new, can fully supply all that we have lost; it is claimed, and indeed it is certain, that with sagacious statesmanship the existing markets within the Empire can be enormously increased. Unhappily, now that we have reverted in Great Britain to that form of single party Government which so many short-sighted people acclaimed, we have released against the necessary proposal to grant the Dominions reciprocal preference a volume of factious hostility as dishonest

as it is bitter. And so it happens to-day that there is almost a general, if a despairing, recognition among Tariff Reformers in Great Britain that until the inexorable logic of our economic situation, present and future, has taught its harsh lessons, our own indispensable contribution to reciprocal preference cannot be carried through by the efforts of a single party, however devoted.

THE IMPERIAL CONNEXION, AND THE POSITION OF CANADA IN THE EMPIRE

This subject, always delicate, cannot be considered altogether apart from some of the matters which have been examined in the earlier part of this chapter. For it is now generally realized by sensible people that the coincidence of sentimental and material interest is stronger for Imperial purposes than either sentimental interest alone, or material interest alone. And therefore every consideration of Imperial patriotism should incline those citizens of the Empire, wherever they live, who desire to maintain them, most zealously to exclude from their minds all pedantry and prejudice which might impede the attempt

to increase the range of business accommodation between the component parts and the Mother Country. There are to be found, unquestionably, throughout the Dominion, innumerable citizens of British extraction who need no stimulus to their devotion. Some of these are the descendants of those loyal Americans who sought a new home under the British Flag rather than acquiesce in the issue of the American revolt. Others have emigrated in their earlier years. Indeed, in this connexion it is of interest to notice that, of those who fought in the first gallant Canadian Division, of whom so many perished in the Second Battle of Ypres, the majority were actually born in Great Britain. Others, again, belong to families whose fathers or grandfathers were the first emigrants; and many of these have refreshed their knowledge of England by frequent visits. Canadian citizens of this kind are uninfluenced, or almost uninfluenced, by the business and political difficulties to which I have made brief allusion.

But it should never be forgotten that the origins of Canadian immigration have been much

modified in recent years. In the Far West, a great number of American farmers have crossed the border and exchanged their nationality. While we may expect from these an attitude of reasonable friendliness, it would be absurd to look for any special sympathy with British institutions or a very general conception of the meaning of Empire. The same observation applies with much greater force to that Scandinavian infusion which has been a noticeable element among immigrants in the last fifteen years. Many of these, naturally enough, see not the slightest reason for maintaining any connexion at all with some small islands 4,000 miles away. Indeed, the great majority living inland have hardly given a thought to the existence or the work of the British Navy.

It is evident, therefore, that in a population diverse in its national origins and sparsely scattered over a gigantic continent, dogmatic generalizations are extremely unsafe. We may, however, for our encouragement, take notice that on three great and critical occasions, there has been elicited from the Canadian people a spontaneous

expression of affection and loyalty which no Englishman can recall without profound emotion.

The first of these was excited by the outbreak of the South African War. Here the resolute determination of the people themselves forced upon the Government, which at that moment believed action to be premature, the recognition that Canada must play some effective part in the field. And so it happened, by a dramatic chance, that the very turning point of that struggle was marked by the decisive valour of Canadian soldiers: for the troops of the Dominion played the principal part in storming at the point of the bayonet the laager behind which sullen Kronje lay at bay.

The second of these occasions arose when the Canadian Government of the day attempted to negotiate a general commercial treaty with the United States of America. In the course of the discussions an American Senator incautiously and in a public speech advocated the absorption of the Dominion at the hands of the United States. From that moment the suggested treaty was doomed, and the resultant election showed

that, friendly as the relations between these two great countries were and are, the citizens of the Dominion are inflexibly determined to maintain their existing status.

Of the third I need hardly speak, for it is still fresh in our minds. The part played by the Dominion in the Great War will never fade from the memories of Englishmen, and has added a new and brilliant page to the long records of our martial achievements. Canada proved—what the prejudices of our regular army never gave our amateur soldiers the chance of proving—that it is not only possible to improvise troops equal to the best conscript armies in the world, but that it is also possible to improvise Generals who certainly need not fear comparison with those of the regular Army.

The material contribution made by the Dominion to the fortunes of the War was stupendous: but even that effort was hardly more important than the glowing moral influence which her adoption of all that underlay the struggle brought to our exertions. Homer once wrote of brothers:

Those upon whom a man relies even though a great struggle arises.

Of the daughter-states within the Empire, as we throw our minds back to this titantic and often uncertain struggle, we may apply and adapt this noble family attribute.

It may perhaps be added that more Englishmen of position ought to realize the usefulness of visiting Canada in order to learn at first hand the resources of this wonderful country and the kindliness of this adventurous people. Nor will they be wise to confine their visits to the well-known cities of the East. No man knows Canada who has not made the journey to Vancouver—soon perhaps to be the greatest of Canadian cities—and Victoria. From such visits nothing but good can come. There will follow better acquaintance, and better acquaintance operating upon common history and traditions will deepen into vivid affection, so that as the rolling seasons pass, we shall witness the ties between the Islands and this mighty country ever deepening in sympathy and in intensity.

PROBLEMS LEFT BY THE GREAT WAR

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS LEFT BY THE GREAT WAR[1]

IT is, I think, indisputable that the present mischiefs in the world can only reach, if they can in any way reach, a solution by discussion and debate. For without discussion and debate action not only cannot be helpful, it may be positively injurious, and the methods by which, as I conceive them, conscientious, laborious, and sustained, those discussions have been carried on in Williamstown seem to me to reproduce in a modern age somewhat the atmosphere in which in ancient days the Socratic dialogues proceeded.

Now I propose to indicate at the outset the method which I may most helpfully pursue, if indeed it is in my power to give any assistance in relation to the topic which I have chosen. I am conscious that everything that is ideal must have been dealt with probably far more fruitfully

[1] Address to the Institute of Politics, Williamstown, Massachusetts, August 24, 1923.

at the hands of the extremely competent and experienced experts who have been debating these topics for, I believe, no less a period than a month. And I may be allowed to say that it would not be creditable either to their originality or to their industry, if they had not in a month produced far more sound and instructive wisdom than can possibly be in my power to reproduce in an hour, even if I had enjoyed the benefits, which I have not, of listening to their discussions, or of reading them.

I propose, therefore, to attempt in the first place a short series of generalizations upon the subject which I have chosen, the subject, namely: Problems left by the Great War. After I have attempted that short series of generalizations I shall ask attention, not, I hope, for too long a period, to some more particular observations which I shall ask leave to make upon some of those problems which seem to me to be the gravest and the most difficult. I am well aware that the subject which I have chosen must involve me in a controversy.

While, therefore, I must treat certain matters

in a way which is not only controversial, but perhaps acutely controversial, and with an appearance of dogmatism which can never be avoided when curtailment is imperatively required by the occasion—while I shall try as far as possible to avoid either an unduly partial statement of that which I hope to indicate, or an unduly dogmatic method of presenting it—I am conscious that no human ingenuity could avoid this double risk.

I will make a few observations first as to an earlier stage of the problem which here demands our attention; for, though the stage is earlier, the problem is the same.

The circumstances amid which the Great War arose were astonishing enough. About twelve very unscrupulous but very powerful men decided, sitting around a table, that there should be war. They deliberated very privately in Berlin. Many cool observers in the world had doubted whether there would be war. I did not happen to be among the number. But there was much to be said for their view; in fact, there was almost everything to be said for it; for no one

charged with the destinies of Germany could pronounce for war unless, besides being an extremely unprincipled, he was also an extremely ignorant man. For Germany, given peace, had everything in her own hands; and her principal trade competitor in Europe was likely to be paralysed by internal dissensions relating to Ireland, which might easily have produced civil war. All Germany had to do was to wait. But, none the less, these twelve narrow, ignorant, arrogant men pronounced in favour of war. Their decisions psychologically had only to consider a weak monarch and a Crown Prince disloyal to that monarch. They triumphed, and from their triumph proceed the devastating consequences with which we and our children, and perhaps our children's children, must reckon for the rest of our and their lives.

The problems of the war were incalculably great; but they were small indeed compared with the problems of the peace. It took ten years to re-create the structure of European society after the Napoleonic wars; and the exhausting expenditure, material and vital, upon those wars

was as nothing compared with that of which it is our duty to make a cool analysis.

It is no use abusing the Treaty of Versailles. That treaty was the creature of the victorious mood of the victorious allies. It is quite easy now to say that more moderate terms could and ought to have been imposed. The answer is complete. Human nature being what it is, no victorious nations could have reconciled with the determination of their democracies terms less severe upon a defeated enemy who had deliberately and wickedly, for motives of national aggrandizement, run the risk of submerging the whole of Western civilization. President Wilson, indeed, came with a noble message of hope; but, unhappily, in the sequel, hope proved to be his principal equipment. It is a fascinating speculation whether, had he been given health and strength to pursue the campaign which he contemplated, his idealism and personality could have affected the forces of the world. I am bold enough, even at the moment when I pay the highest tribute to his unselfish and courageous motives, to doubt it. For the real truth is, that

while the whole world requires the encouragement and the light of idealism, the whole world would probably not survive if idealism were given a completely free rein.

The same simple, illuminating, if cynical, truth, applies to that hideous competition in the world by which every individual who does not inherit a fortune is confronted. The great Bentham long since pointed out that the motive spring, and the necessary motive spring, of human endeavour, was self-interest; and he equally pointed out that the consequences would certainly be obscure, and in his judgment would be unfortunate, if every individual began to regulate his or her life, not upon his or her own interests, but upon some supposed interest of others. And, indeed, a very cautious mind might stagger before such a possibility. No creature in the world—human, animal, or, it might also be added, vegetable—has ever regulated his, her, or its life upon a basis such as that under consideration. And when it is considered that the world has already lasted for some millions (or billions) of years, and that countless billions of breathing

creatures have inhabited this world during that period, an experience so unanimous and so entirely unaffected either by Christianity or by civilization, at least affords to a scientific observer the material for an irresistible generalization.

And the same great truth applies equally to nations. No nation in democratic conditions will ever be allowed to become the knight-errant of the world. The governors of each nation are the trustees of the whole people; and, unhappily, they are removable trustees. They must always keep pace with the beneficiaries of the trust because the beneficiaries in this particular matter can at any moment discharge them from their offices. And therefore, it seems to me that while the name of President Wilson must always be revered by those who render homage to purposes almost superhuman, pursued with a zeal almost as superhuman, yet it must none the less be recognized that his judgment of his own countrymen was wrong, and that by the error of that judgment he became, paradoxically enough, the agent of all those post-war developments from

which his altruistic mind would most specially have recoiled.

I, for myself, have no delusions as to the only function which the American Government is called upon to discharge. Their primary, and indeed their only duty, is to the American people. If by intervention in the affairs of a stricken Europe they can advance the fortunes of the American people, then it seems to me, as a humble observer, that it would be their duty to make such an intervention. But if in cool perspective they reached the conclusion that no compensating gain to the American people would result from re-assuming European and world responsibility, they would be failing in their duty if they embraced an unnecessary responsibility.

This, and this alone, is the problem of the moment. Who shall marshal the arguments? The most acute and learned political dialectician in the world might fly from the task in despair. And, indeed, the great economists and financiers of the world have, in the last four years, proved little able to afford us sound guidance or even accurate prediction. Who is there to-day who

has appreciated the complete economic consequences of the accumulation of so much gold in America upon the export trade of America? Who is there who can tell us clearly over how long a period the immense domestic market of the United States will be adequate for the equally immense manufacturing resources of her great cities? Who has yet convincingly analysed, in relation to the devastating problems of modern exchanges, the effect of a high tariff system? Who has accurately measured the effect upon the agricultural community of the United States of the existing and artificially-produced economic conditions? The farmers of the Middle West have long, in my understanding of American history, been among the great figures of her ordered community. They have been efficient; they have been industrious; they have been conservative in the sense, non-political, in which all reasonable men see praise in that adjective. Are the present conditions of the world favourable, or even tolerable, to them? Are they likely to improve? Are they affected by the present condition of the world? Can they be permanently

alleviated while the conditions of that stricken world remain unchanged? If I am right in supposing that the deflated condition of Europe, as Europe is to-day, already affords grave anxiety to the agricultural community of America, and may, in the future, however remote, occasion an equal and analogous anxiety to her manufacturing community, I have at least established all that I care to establish: that grave and not very remote problems await the decision of the American nation.

For myself, I have never varied in my view. Great nations not only deserve, but require, a great world in which to develop their own greatness. Commercial genius flourishes when the whole world flourishes; and its prospects decline when the whole world declines. Shipping, invisible exchanges, interest on money borrowed by stable creditors—these are the garnered rewards afforded to the thrift and financial efficiency of the nations which are happy enough to possess those assets. But if we substitute for the conditions which existed before the war, a world in which there are no markets for anything which

industry can produce, because hardly anyone in the world can afford to buy at the present rate of exchanges that which such manufacturing nations as America and Great Britain can produce, then, sooner or later, the experience of both peoples must be the same. The manufacturing genius of America is great; so is the manufacturing genius of Britain. To-day we British are suffering more than America in our manufacturing, if not in our agricultural community, because our home market is smaller. But if and when the home market of the United States ceases to employ in their fullest energy the resources of her manufacturers, the resultant position, combined with the existing agricultural situation, will bring Americans almost precisely to the position which to-day we British feel. Nor will gold reserves help them. Nor have they very much helped any people in the world. The strength of the world lies neither in gold nor in precious jewels; it lies in the ordered and peaceful industry of great populations harnessed to those occupations by which, in the imperfectly defined purposes of the Author of the universe, all alike

must earn their living. And the genius of great peoples, while we maintain our present economic systems, will find its reward in extricating a world of suffering, not unwilling to work, from its present morass, and in releasing and reanimating the economic forces which, and which alone, can bring prosperity to the body politic and economic of the whole world.

I indicated that I should precede the more particular observations I have to make by a series of generalizations which, because they must necessarily be brief, must, of equal necessity, be bold, and it has occurred to me that it might interest if by way of some particular illustrations I indicated a few general conclusions as to the situation of several of the most important nations in Europe at this moment. And at least I make this claim with boldness, that if I err, if I do too much justice to one country and too little justice to another, it is not because I am not making a sincere and an honest attempt to see the situation as the situation actually is, excluding as far as I can exclude all national, all emotional, and all

cosmopolitan prejudice from my mind. Let me, then, so far indulge the egotism of an Englishman by selecting first for consideration the case of my own country.

The generous admission of the American nation has been freely and generously made that England made sacrifices in the Great War of which I am content that it is to be moderately stated, in the words of a great American, that they were sacrifices worthy of the martial history of that country. I need not recall the loss of life almost comparable to that sustained by France, which has destroyed for ever the hopes of so many English homes with an anguish more widely spread than that with which the Angel of Death has ever in our annals entered the palace of the great or the home of the humble. Still less do I speak insistently now of the treasure, collected painfully and industriously over centuries, which my country flung without a thought and without a question into the common cause.

But I would ask attention to the situation in England as we see that situation to-day. We have balanced our budget. We have not shrunk

from a sustained stringency of taxation, comparable, to say the least, with that by which America is crushed at this moment. For that reason, our credit is high; we have followed—I know not whether we have followed too closely—the hard and painful road to deflation, rather than the easy primrose path to inflation; and by an incorrigible habit which our country has pursued through the centuries, which I think has not, perhaps, been without some resultant and compensating advantages to our credit in the world—we have made arrangements—however cruel the burden—for the payment of our debts. And this we have hitherto done whether we borrowed the money for our own consumption or for the accommodation of a friend who at that moment was in a difficulty. But such is our situation; and nothing more need be said about it until I come to make a very brief observation on the subject of reparations.

If I am right—and the great majority of the victorious nations will agree that I am right—in making the claim that this war with all its staggering cost in blood and treasure was forced by a

guilty country upon a reluctant world—if that claim be not too bold, it follows plainly and unarguably from it, that, quite apart from the financial aspect of compensating those who were the innocent victims of an aggressive war, and who sustained ruinous consequences both in their vital and their financial affairs; it follows that quite apart from that consideration, for the mere warning of nations in the future, the price paid for such guilt ought to be and must be heavy.

But here, unhappily, the position of Great Britain is not especially favourable, because to us it sometimes seems as if almost all the world except ourselves lived in a universe of which the general atmosphere issued from a series of very astonishing illusions. It has sometimes seemed to us that there is a general view, certainly held almost universally in Europe, a general view that such is the simplicity of the British character, that this nation can be relied upon not merely to adopt a course, so far unimitated by others, of paying our just debts, but that we are also to forgive everyone else, whoever they may be, everything that they may owe us, whatever the

cause of that indebtedness may be. Such an assumption, however gratifying to the reputation which our country has established in history, however eloquent of the practical application of the Sermon on the Mount, which, almost alone among the nations, we are supposed to be capable of making and to have made—I say, however gratifying these tributes are, there are quite a considerable number of persons in England who are not able to subscribe to them.

For let me indicate by way of simple illustration what the consequences would be. But first of all let me give, as I can do in one or two simple sentences, the general continental atmosphere to-day.

First of all, it is always assumed in Germany that " we shall have to pay something to France; we shall have to pay something to Belgium; we may have to pay something to Italy, but on a general accommodation, it may surely be assumed that Great Britain will waive her claim." Whether there will be much to waive as the ruin of central Europe develops, might be made a subject of curious controversy, and I do not pursue it now;

but I rather pass to another source from which we might hope to obtain something; that is to say, from those allies who have taken a somewhat different view of sound finance to ourselves in the last four years and on whose behalf we guaranteed indebtedness during the years of the war. Their view of the matter seems to me to be an extremely simple one: "It is quite true, in a pedantic business sense, you may say we owe this money to you, but pedantry is one thing and sentiment and realities are quite different things, and you cannot, in view of the bloody road we trod together, ask us to pay you."

I assure you that is the general atmosphere prevailing in Europe. Suppose that we yield to it, tempted by the additional attraction offered, that if and when Germany pays a sum of money which everybody who is not in a lunatic asylum knows Germany can never pay, "if and when she pays us in full, then we will most readily pay you what we owe you." I myself should have been a much richer man if I had been able to regulate my own small matters of indebtedness upon a somewhat similar basis. In fact, only

the other day I observed that an eloquent and well-known writer in a French paper said quite plainly, "Our debts—our debts—our debts are the scars of the war." That, of course, is one way of looking at the matter. I rather wish it had occurred to us. We looked at a debt of honour through different eyes.

Another writer, this time an Italian writer, in an article which was brought to my attention ten days ago, made the following illuminating observation. He said, "We are told that Great Britain is going to forgive us our debt to her." Who told him, I do not know. "Well, a year ago, we should have welcomed the assurance, but now it has been so generally assumed that it ceases to cause us any particular excitement."

Observe, then, where my unfortunate country is. We are not apparently to receive anything from the German reparations. We are not able to draw any considerable cheques upon that bank in which is kept an account for the scars of war. We are, as it is our wish, and was always our fixed intention, for the reasons I have given, historical and inherent in the character of our

people, to pay our own debts. We have not laid and do not propose to lay any complaint whatever, but in what situation will that leave us? If these gloomy apprehensions are acquiesced in they will leave us in this condition : that we, who, after all, were not more conspicuously defeated than another nation, are the only nation that is really paying indemnity, unless Germany pays some. This is perhaps a surprising outcome of the rather remarkable efforts we made during those four years. But if this be the result it must be the result.

Such is the train of thought which is passing through many British minds. Let us see whether or not I can apply my judgment with equal impartiality to what I conceive to be the French view.

For many years before the war France was bullied and humiliated by Germany in the face of the whole world. Instead of resting content with the striking victory which ended with the transfer to Germany of the province of Alsace-Lorraine; without being content with that, the bungling diplomacy of Germany, foolishly ap-

prehensive of a swift expansion of Russian strength, neglected no occasion by which it might remind France that she had been a defeated, and in the judgment of Germany, was still a negligible nation. The legacy of bitterness and resentment which had been left by the campaign of Sedan deepened and intensified as the result of a brutal and insensate diplomacy.

And so we came to this war—a war which incontestably, as far at least as we are concerned, we no longer propose to reargue, was forced by Germany upon France. A considerable part of France was devastated; inconceivable savageries were perpetrated in obedience to the doctrine of so-called horribleness. And at the end, France undoubtedly feels, and in many ways France quite rightly feels, that Germany has not paid what Germany could pay, and that a deliberate attempt is being made by subterranean manipulations of the paper currency at home and by the export of assets abroad, to produce a bankruptcy which may indeed be official, but which has no correspondence with the actual and potential resources of the people measured

in their material possessions and their organizing power.

Such is the French conception, and there is, of course, much to be said for it. There is a great deal to be said for the view that you should obtain the maximum amount which is payable by Germany so long as you do not impair her capacity to pay anything at all.

I was myself opposed to the French occupation of the Ruhr, because no nation has anything to gain by any further complications in the political situation in those districts. The only interest that we have in that situation—and America still retains some small financial interest—the only interest is whether or not the step which she is taking is one which is likely to produce a larger reparation; otherwise the matter does not concern us, except in its purely political side.

The French, however, went into the Ruhr, and the moment they went there, in the teeth of our protests, I have always plainly maintained that they were committed; and that the flag of France was committed to the experiment. And I see myself no means whatever which are within

our power to adopt, or which it would be conceivable that we should adopt, to terminate that experiment. We may agree or we may disagree, but the French are in the Ruhr, and it is by the development of the situation which has been produced by their occupation, and by that development alone, that it will be shown whether they were right or whether we were. But we may be allowed solemnly to notice that whatever other compensating advantages—if there be compensating advantages—have flowed from the occupation of the Ruhr, the prospect of Great Britain obtaining any reparations at all has evidently been diminished.

A concluding observation upon the subject of Germany may perhaps be permitted. I have not hesitated to state quite plainly my conception of the primary responsibility for the terrible war, the memories of which still, in their poignancy, throng our minds. But, while I make that observation, there are certain circumstances which require to be borne in mind. It is necessary, for the correction and the warning of those who may be tempted in the future along the promising

road of international crime—it is necessary to remind them that a nation cannot escape responsibility, and cannot evade punishment, by pointing to its Government and saying that they and not the nation are responsible. If such a plea were ever admitted the jurisprudence of a nation and the decisions of war would prove to be equally nugatory. Such a claim cannot be admitted, but a distinction must of course be drawn between the case of a democracy, and that of a nation which lived under an autocracy, which had no real voice in its own Government, which was powerless without a revolution to control the foreign policy of that Government, and which found itself with easy promises of swift, immediate material aggrandizement launched upon the primrose road which it had trod itself in previous historic campaigns. A distinction, I think, in justice must in this respect be drawn between a democracy which has deliberately maintained and supported a policy, and a nation upon which by an autocrat or by a military caste that policy has been imposed. The distinction must not be exaggerated nor its consequences

magnified, but that there is such a distinction I do not doubt. And equally I do not doubt that there are many in Germany to-day, honest men, particularly of the middle classes, who have seen every farthing which they possessed dissipated while the mark joins the rouble in its devil's dance; men who had no more responsibility for the war than you and I had. I can conceive of many such thinking that there are respects in which they have not perhaps been afforded a real chance of making pecuniary reparation without involving themselves in complete ruin.

The first ground, therefore, upon which, if I were a German, I should base a plea, not indeed for reconsideration of the major decisions, for those decisions are irrevocably taken; but at least for some degree of consideration and perhaps of reconsideration, would be thus: "You must tell a people if you are going to involve them in the payment of immense sums of money; you must tell them, not a fanciful figure which you state for the purposes of the impossible maximum, but you must tell them in real terms which you intend and are able to enforce, the amount which they

must pay; and it must be an amount which conceivably at least they can pay." And therefore, I for one, and I think all English people, warmly welcome a proposal, of which I believe Mr. Secretary Hughes was the author, that a commission should be appointed in order to determine the amount which Germany can pay. But the unfortunate part of that suggestion, at the moment when it has been pressed for the adoption of the French nation, is that it has come when they are committed to the Ruhr experiment, and when in consequence they are almost logically committed to maintaining the authority of the Reparations Commission whose principal and primary function is to solve this very question, namely: what Germany can pay.

I have tried to keep myself, dealing with the case of England, in the position of an Englishman, anxious neither to be partial nor unfair, and so to state the world situation as it strikes and must strike him. We know only too well that the direct consequence of the condition of Europe is the unemployment which has grown and will grow in all our great cities, and which

seems likely to reach even a more sombre climax as time goes on. Much, I think, as I have stated it would be the general view of the ordinary Englishman trying to state the position fairly and clearly.

I have also tried to put myself in the position of a French citizen charged with the same duty of stating his case. I hope that the points upon which I made it plain, that I found myself unable to agree with the policy of the French Government, have not made it impossible for me to appreciate the feelings which have operated in their minds or the bitterness and resentment which have led them to so many conclusions.

And, observe that it is equally our duty to ascertain what points there are, if there be any such points, which can be fairly placed before a reasonable conqueror by a nation which has been defeated. I cannot eliminate from my mind, neither can most people, the uneasy activities of various great financial figures in Germany who have been enabled by transfers of capital and by the conversion of paper into solid and more durable assets, to produce some of the

amazing consequences which have recently marked the downward fall of German currency. I cannot say whether the situation and these charges, for they are openly made, are ill-founded, but I should not exhaust the possibilities which are entertained as to the actual situation in Germany if I did not utter a reminder that by a well-informed section of European opinion these views are commonly held.

Few will disagree that I use moderate language when I say that the war has bequeathed to Europe perplexing and it may be ruinous problems. Great Britain cannot indefinitely support the burden of unemployment which has involved her, properly it may be, in the payment over so many years of such gigantic sums. To us it is necessary, for we are neither self-supporting nor primarily agricultural; to us it is necessary that we should replace the markets that we have lost, or cease to maintain an industrial population upon our soil. And so ceasing we perish.

The gravity and difficulty of this problem have not been diminished by the circumstance

that our population has grown on a scale so surprising as we have observed since the war. France has her problems. Germany, of all others, has her own. Is there any ray of hope which at this moment can be presented? Can any alleviation be found, I neither claim nor ask nor hope in the near future, but in a period of five or even ten years? I should not deal honestly with my theme if I concealed my own conclusion, that unless some change unforeseen by me, unforeseeable by me, occurs in the present situation, the condition of all Europe must grow progressively worse.

We can indeed, no doubt, modelling ourselves upon the exceptional geographical situation and resources of America, more and more deflect British credits into our own dominions and extend and encourage our colonial markets. We can more and more reassert the British policy of isolation, sustained for so many centuries teeming with great historic events. We can say to Europe, "Continue if you will the ruinous courses to which you are committed, the British Empire will appeal to its own people; will develop its own

markets; will concentrate its finances and its resources upon its own dominion." And yet, this is a part which I should myself be sorry to see carried to its sad and cynical conclusion. A tragic moment comes when nations who trod together so many years the bloody road of death, who breathed so many years the black air almost of despair, say at the one moment when the battle has been won after so much struggle and so much endeavour, " We carried through that incredible and man-destroying task; from the minor task of statecraft that remained, we have recoiled in mutual estrangement."

I still hope and I still believe, though I am not bold enough to express this feeling in terms of time—I still hope and I still believe that all the nations who saved civilization, which would otherwise have been destroyed, will one day realize and convince themselves that not merely the interest of Europe but the individual interest of every great country in the world requires that some common effort shall be made to alleviate and correct the misery under which Europe is groaning to-day and before which Europe may

so easily succumb. Then, not only shall we have won the greatest war in history, but our names will be remembered and acclaimed by generations to come as the men who were not unequal to a nobler task, that of winning the greatest peace in history.

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IN THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER V

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IN THE UNITED STATES[1]

THE subject matter of these few observations on the British constitution and its developments in half a century may be defended upon a broader ground than that the subject, as I was assured, would be neither disagreeable nor unattractive to American lawyers. Examined from a converse angle, the writings of the late Lord Bryce upon the Constitution of the United States of America never failed to excite the interest and the admiration of British lawyers; and equally the recent lectures upon the Supreme Court of the U.S.A., delivered at Gray's Inn, in London, by Mr. Solicitor-General Beck, excited a wide degree of professional interest. No service is rendered to Anglo-American relations by exaggerating the debt which America owes either to the British Constitution or to her jurisprudence.

[1] Speech delivered before the American Bar Assn., August, 1923

But nevertheless that debt is very great. In constitutional matters the peculiar genius of American statesmen has produced a complex system in which much to an Englishman seems wholly admirable and much, if he be permitted the criticism, of more disputable value.

One thing at least is certain. The framers of the American Constitution produced something which was original and which purchased certain acknowledged advantages at the cost of certain hardly less disputable disadvantages. But the men of former generations chose their own course. They were strong men, seeing as far as most men of their day and generation could see. Whether, if some divine revelation had forewarned them of the incredible development in the values of world importance which awaited the American nation, they would still have formulated her primary constitutional document in the same terms I cannot tell. I suspect that while they might have reasoned with some suspicion that the prospect savoured of megalomania they would still have pursued the same policy. They would perhaps have said:

> We do not ask to see the distant scene,
> One step enough for us.

And herein they would have been right. They were strong men with clear views. They were the pilots of an immediate and obscure voyage. Their evident and immediate responsibilities were contemporary.

These observations are not intended to suggest that the genius of the framers of the American Constitution have not been justified by the years that have supervened. They are intended rather to make it plain, without establishing comparative valuations, how profoundly their conceptions differed from the British conception of constitutional evolution. I suspect, without finding leisure to discuss the matter here, that the explanation is to be found in the contemporary political atmosphere.

But the difference between the two constitutions is profound. It may ultimately prove to be a difference altogether creditable to the genius of those Americans of old. The last verdict upon this issue will not be pronounced until the industrial and social questions of America, in

which I am daring enough to include the Negro problem, have reached a longer and a more sophisticated test. It may, for instance, well be that two centuries more must pass before any man can be sure of the future alignment and the future strength of the Labour Party in America.

The problems of America at this moment are not comparable to those of Britain, simply because the infusion of population into the States has proceeded from channels so cosmopolitan. Discordant languages and traditions do not lend themselves for generations to a homogeneous socialist creed—perhaps they will not do so for two hundred years.

The forces which as inevitably in the United States as elsewhere must one day be challenged, will not effect the cohesion by which an older European civilization is to-day confronted. But one day that issue will be sharply challenged. And then, and not until then, will it be fully realized how far the barriers which the framers of the American Constitution imposed upon the complete freedom of her legislative assemblies have been justified by the longer prevision.

Upon the negro problem, upon the labour problem and their contingent anxieties it would ill-become one who is not an American to make a rash intrusion. But any honest analyst of contemporary politics and of the effect of the element to which I have made a passing reference, must recognize at once that this question cannot be permanently eliminated from an examination of the comparative merits of a constitution ultimately controlled by the judicature and of a constitution not so controlled.

For herein lies the fundamental difference between your constitution and ours. Your constitution is expressed and defined in documents which can be pronounced upon by the Supreme Court. In this sense your judges are the masters of your executive. Your constitution is a cast-iron document. It fails to be construed by the Supreme Court with the same sense of easy and admitted mastery as any ordinary contract. This circumstance provides a breakwater of enormous value against ill-considered and revolutionary change.

Whether if the forces behind revolutionary

change become menacing and strong enough the breakwater will serve must be left for the future to determine. But an outsider must fully and absolutely admit that up to the present its strength has seemed extremely adequate.

The President of your Association[1] is one for whom intellectually I have a great admiration, and personally a deep affection. In his masterly Presidential address one refinement was surely a little subtle. He said that the Supreme Court had not the right *in abstracto* to construe the American fundamental constitutional document, but only in relation to the issues presented by an individual litigation. But is this, in ultimate analysis, a very serious derogation? When an issue challenged by an individual raises the question whether a law is constitutional or not, the decision of the Supreme Court decides this question for all time, or if the decision is against the legislation the attempted law is stripped of its attempted authority.

In Great Britain, rightly or wrongly, we have proceeded upon a different basis to yours.

[1] Mr. John W. Davis.

The genius of the Anglo-Saxon people has, again rightly or wrongly, refused to shackle in the slightest degree the constitutional competence of later generations. And thus it happens that practically no law in Great Britain is constitutional in the sense in which you have a constitution. Any law in Great Britain can be altered by any Parliament and no court may challenge the constitutional force of any Act of Parliament. The late Professor Dicey distinguished the two forms of constitution by calling one rigid and the other flexible. On the whole I prefer to call the one controlled and the other uncontrolled. The difference is prodigious, whatever label you prefer. It is, on the whole, premature to decide whether America or Britain has been right.

But the ease with which the gravest political changes may be made in Great Britain has afforded and will afford anxiety in the future. For uncontrolled power and an imperfectly educated democracy go ill together. In England we have chosen to take these risks. America, on the whole, has chosen to avoid them. It is not uninstructive to observe the changes which have

taken place in the constitution of Great Britain in the fifty or sixty years which have witnessed political readjustments so immense and far-reaching.

Sixty years ago Great Britain was the mother of representative and parliamentary institutions. But still she was not a democracy. The menacing fights associated with the great Reform Act were in contrast with the issues of a graver day like the military minuets of eighteenth-century Continental warfare.

There was neither reality nor vitality in the results. The formidable controversy which arose on the famous Reform Bill, which nearly brought down the House of Lords, and might quite easily have involved the Monarchy, increased the electorate but only by a despicable percentage which could not, in any degree that mattered, deflect the centre of political gravity. The increase of voters proposed was hardly more than that of 3 to 5 per cent. Wellington, Gladstone, Disraeli all played their parts in a controversy which was largely unreal, because the changes proposed, and so bitterly disputed, were really so unim-

portant. But they carried in the womb a portentous embryo.

The genius of Disraeli, contemptuous of the taunt, not unjustly made against him, of inconsistency, made the first real change. And thereafter progressively the advance has proceeded. And in the furnace of the Great War Great Britain took the immense responsibility of handing over to the masses of her population the control of her destinies, though her legislators well knew that no written constitution and no law court could fetter or clog the completeness of that which was given.

Far the greatest development, therefore, in the British constitution in the last sixty years is that which has handed over absolutely without reserve the control of the government of Great Britain. This charter so given will never, it may be confidently predicted, be withdrawn by law. If we give a rein to curious speculation we may wonder whether the powers so given, if insanely exercised, will be corrected by a movement so astonishing as the Fascisti movement in Italy. Short of this, nothing could or would correct the

uncontrolled power, which now lies at the disposal of the pencil of the British electorate.

First, then, of all of the great developments to be noted in the last sixty years is that which has swept aside the last vestige of real territorial influence over British politics, and has left the whole of an ancient and glorious constitution in the melting-pot to be moulded by unknown and incalculable forces. I shall be unwilling to be supposed as an over-anxious critic of these revolutions, anxious as they are. For I profoundly believe in the common sense and in the fundamental sanity of the Anglo-Saxon race. For if one did not so believe, one could only despair. The number of those who have hardly anything of that which seriously counts is so much greater than the number of those who have, that if a crude campaign of class hatred had any prospect of real success in Great Britain its declaration would be certain.

But while I acknowledge many causes for grave anxiety, I am none the less of opinion that the fundamental sobriety and poise of the British people, even with full allowance for an untested

electorate, will attain to a just perspective and pronounce honest decisions. And yet this question cannot be exhausted without examining another tendency very observable to-day in Great Britain which at first sight might appear to be rather concerned with politics or with sociology than with constitutional development. But such an impression would be superficial and even delusive. For nothing could more closely relate to the topic of constitutional development than the emergence of an immense political force whose claim one day to form a Government can no longer be disputed,[1] and whose expressed views, if they so succeed, must profoundly and perhaps for all time, affect the workings of the British Constitution.

Twenty-five years ago when Parliament met, one solitary pioneer of the Socialist movement was returned to the House. This was Mr. Keir Hardie. Though a rugged, he was, I think, a sincere man; this at least is certain that he clearly

[1] These observations were made before the present Socialist Government came into office; and ten years before, if sane counsels had been accepted, any Socialist Government could have aspired to office.

discerned that the political future of labour lay in its complete divergence from both the older parties. He was in fact the founder of the Independent Labour Party. From this small beginning the movement has continuously grown. The following election brought to Mr. Hardie some 12 followers who drove amid a cheering mob into Palace Yard, presage, to those who had eyes to see, of the most formidable political developments.

At the general election of December, 1922, 150 members of this party were returned to the House, so that it exceeded the aggregate strength of the Liberals led by Mr. Asquith or of those who recognize Mr. Lloyd George as their leader. In these circumstances the official of the Opposition was chosen from the ranks of the Labour Party, and it would follow in obedience to the covenants of our Constitution that, if the Government were defeated as the result of a Socialist attack in Parliament, the King would send for Mr. Ramsay MacDonald to form a Government.

It is not my purpose here to discuss the results

which would attend the attempt of the Socialist Party to carry the constituencies in sufficient strength to make them the governors of Great Britain. I state my feelings here as a lawyer, quite dispassionately, measuring probabilities precisely as I should measure them in order to base upon my conclusion decision and action.

And I am not on the whole of opinion that an early success awaits the Socialist Party in Great Britain. They are divided among themselves. They are honeycombed by rivalries and jealousies. They do not agree upon many fundamental principles. They cannot unite, unless it be in opposition. It would carry me far from my present purpose to examine the merits either of a capital levy; or of the socialization of the means of production, distribution, and exchange.

It is sufficient for me to say that in my judgment, whether these proposals be good or whether they be bad on their merits, the immediate result of either would be so to deflate British credit through the world that the whole of its majestic edifice might easily crumble above a foundation proven to be unsound. And in my opinion,

that sanity and sobriety of the British people, in which I have already expressed my complete confidence, would at the critical moment recoil from a risk so tremendous. I am, myself, of opinion that a Labour Government would not, if it were afforded an opportunity, prove to be altogether unconservative.

It would be very nervous. It would be very anxious to avoid the obvious criticism that it was destroying the foundations of commerce and industry. The principal enemy of Labour success in Great Britain to-day is not, in my judgment, anything which a Labour Government would succeed in effecting. It is the apprehension in the minds of a majority of the electors of that which they might do if they held the reins of power. The relevance of this topic to my general theme lies in the certain effect upon our constitution of Socialist success, if and when Socialism attains such a success.

In the first place the House of Lords would cease to be an efficient instrument of government. Its reform, too long delayed, would become imperative. And that reform would lie in the hands

of men out of sympathy with its history, its traditions and its character. To begin with no real Labour Minister would be, and none could in the existing circumstances become, a member of that House. The mere fact that there is a possibility, which no cautious politician can altogether disregard, that the Labour Party may at some period, not altogether remote, be returned to power, would appear to make it imperative upon those who are in office to-day that they should effect such reformation in the constitution of the House of Lords as would at least qualify it for survival as a contributory branch of the legislature in the contingency which I have attempted to examine.

The next development historically which requires consideration is concerned with the position of the House of Lords. The constitutional powers of that body were until recently, if asserted to the full compass of their theoretical scope, untenable and even mediæval. And yet wisely stewarded in a country so conservative they could have been made available for many generations. For the English political mind had

no particular prejudice against the House of Lords or against the hereditary system, which so many Americans find it difficult to understand. If they had, the English monarchy could not have survived so long with a prestige which, as I shall show later, has not declined.

But the condition of the retention of the powers of the House of Lords was that those powers should not be too openly harnessed to the chariot of a particular party. The nation was not, indeed, on the whole unprepared that the exercise of its powers should be conservative in the non-political sense; but it was justly impatient of any attempt to make a constituent branch of the legislature the mere tool of a single party. And, therefore, a fatal mistake was made when that House compromised so many causes upon which the greatness of the country depended in the cause of that which was described in the cant of the moment as the People's Budget.

All that was operative in that Budget was, and has since proved to be, trash. It has been thrown since, with general approval, upon the political dust-heap. But the House of Lords,

under bad advice, reasserting a prerogative, which unquestionably survived theoretically, but upon which no wise man should have insisted, brought itself into sharp and fatal collision with a powerful though fugitive wave of contemporary opinion.

No one can foresee the results. But this at least is certain, that until the House of Lords be reconstituted and reformed Great Britain is the only country in the world which has at once an uncontrolled constitution and an ineffective second chamber. The House of Lords no doubt still retains a powerful instrument to ensure delay. And this power may be very formidable. But it cannot be effective unless it is certain that the tenure of power of the Government of the day is fugitive; and in relation to all finance the House of Lords is now powerless.

The extreme sections of the Conservative Party never ceased to attack the Coalition Government because it did not reform the House of Lords. Mr. Asquith had affirmed and had broken his own solemn pledge to make this reform complete. The Coalition Government produced pro-

posals which even if inadequate in relation to the ultimate problems would have mitigated the constitutional disabilities amid which we labour to-day.

The 1922-23 Conservative Government has done nothing; nor can I see any reason whatever for conjecturing that it can or will do anything. The critics of the British Constitution are therefore entitled to point out, firstly, that we have a constitution at the mercy of a momentary gust of parliamentary opinion; and secondly, that we have no second chamber equipped with the political and constitutional power to resist such a gust. Looked at abstractedly, the position would appear to be hopeless. It would be hopeless to anyone who has not studied the political and constitutional history of the English people.

But it is not my purpose here to indicate the methods, if there be such, by which we may hope to disentangle ourselves from this present difficulty. It is, on the contrary, my purpose to indicate the difficulties in which our recent political developments have involved the British Constitution.

Constitutionalism

And now I pass to another topic. The British Empire must on the whole be pronounced to be the most amazing congeries of self-governing communities which has ever spontaneously supported the fabric of a great empire. Ten years ago it was a fashionable subject of speculation among political writers whether that fabric could survive either the tests of peace or the tests of war. The tests of peace over a long period still remain to be probed.

Out of the crucible of war the British Empire has emerged on the whole as the most amazing phenomenon in history. And consistently with the whole development of British constitutional precedent nothing has been put in writing. All the premiers of all the Dominions assisted in, and made themselves responsible for, the deliberations from which the Treaty of Versailles emerged. A new Cabinet was formed. It was not the Cabinet of the British Isles. It was the Cabinet of the British Empire.

It was proposed by someone that the constitution of this new Cabinet, a Cabinet not unlikely to play a decisive part in the world's history for

centuries, should be reduced to writing. Mr. Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia, with equal flair and force, disputed this view and carried his point. And so to-day it happens that the new constitution of the British Empire is attested by no record in any constitutional document.

But it is none the less true that there will never again be a formidable orientation of British policy, which has not obtained the assent of the Dominions. And it may, therefore, be moderately claimed that of all the changes which half a century has brought to English constitutional life, the most pregnant is that which has associated the great Dominions on equal terms with the British Foreign Office in everything which determines alike the domestic and international fortunes of the commonwealth.

I have no leisure to trace in detail minor aspects of development, which the constitutional historians of the last fifty years must record with conscientious detail. But this superficial survey would be incomplete, in relation even to its own standards, if it did not take some note of the

changes, such as they may be, which fifty years have introduced in the position and prestige of the British monarchy.

Queen Victoria was a very masterful woman. With limitations, she was even a great woman. But her conception of the monarchical prerogative would to-day have been impossible. Her bed-chamber crisis; her dismissal of Lord Palmerston, and her openly avowed preference for Mr. Disraeli over Mr. Gladstone; would in this age have been neither tolerable nor tolerated. But to make this admission is not to concede that the power of the monarchy has really declined.

On the contrary, the prestige of the monarchy, and the influence of the monarchy, in the prudent and conscientious hands of King George have rather waxed than waned. No great decision of state, it may confidently be claimed, is taken without close discussion with the sovereign. He cannot, and he would not, claim to deflect the clear view of a strong Cabinet. But no Cabinet, however strong, could afford to disregard the difficulties and doubts put forward by a sovereign who has no interest in party politics, and whose

experience is reinforced by continuity and immutability.

The historian, therefore, who appraises the development of the British Constitution must, on the whole, recognize that in a changing world the influence of the British monarchy has been preserved unchanged. The degree of the influence will no doubt vary with the personality of him or her who wears the crown. Queen Victoria had her special strength and her special qualities. King Edward had his. King George at the most difficult period of all has accepted in his own person a kingly responsibility which has done as much to strengthen the British monarchy as any one of his predecessors since the constitution of England became a reality and not a theory.

The future of the world is incalculable. The decision is premature whether America has been right in trying to control the free will of a free people by judicial authority, or whether Britain has been right in trusting the free will of a free people to work out their own salvation.

ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

CHAPTER VI

ON INTERNATIONAL LAW[1]

UNTIL the month of August, 1914, it was generally, though not quite completely, true that the civilized nations of the world had, over a long period of time, combined to increase the authority of international law. Indeed, from the days of Grotius there had, until ten years ago, been discernible a hardening tendency upon the "legal" side of a body of doctrine which never, of course, could, except metaphorically, be called law at all.

The science of law has, throughout the ages, been the subject of much cultivated and learned controversy. But when the analysts like Austin had completed their analysis; and the historians like Maine had written the last lines of their histories; there emerged from their co-operative activities a general recognition among writers

[1] Speech before the Canadian Bar Association, September 3, 1923.

upon jurisprudence that, whatever other quality is demanded by the conception of law, that of compulsive assertion by a superior is vital and indispensable. In other words, a law is not a law unless someone superior to yourself can penalize and chastise you for its breach.

The earliest writers upon the subject of international law were not only masters of casuistry; not only consummate dialecticians; they were also golden, incorrigible optimists. For they found Europe as we may even find it to-morrow —a welter of savagery, a scene of desolation and abomination; amid which the garnered treasures of Greek and Roman civilization had perished.

To a man like Grotius, with a mind incredibly powerful and versatile, too shrewd for self-illusion, it must have been plain how slow, how painful, and how precarious must be the development of the tiny seedling which he planted with so much courage and so much hope. For many passages of his immortal work make it plain that he realized that it was not, and probably never would be, possible to assimilate international law

to municipal law. And yet, with a bold and generous vision, he lavished all the powers of an incredibly well-endowed mind upon the attempt to fling an atmosphere of law around the moral code upon which, as he clearly saw, the whole fabric of future civilization might, and almost certainly would, depend. Peering into the future, this remarkable man must almost certainly have reasoned to himself somewhat in this way:

International law can never become a real law unless and until there is formed a concourse of nations able to agree upon that which shall be law; resolved to enforce it upon recalcitrant members; and armed, by mutual agreement, with the material force necessary to restrain and coerce those members of the international family who disobey its decrees. Such a League of Nations (I think Grotius may have said to himself) is little likely to arise in this imperfect world. But some progress is possible. The moral precepts which ought as surely to guide the actions of nations, as those of individuals, may be so camouflaged as law (though I hardly think he used the word) that in time the majority of civilized

nations will tend more and more to accord to these moral precepts the actual authority of law. They will do so, I hope, because the majority in most countries will prefer to act morally rather than unmorally. They will do so, at any rate, I believe, because most sensible statesmen will realize that on the whole it pays to behave decently, and in the manner which most moral and educated men admit to be decent. The great fathers of international law would undoubtedly have expressed their meaning more formally, more lengthily, more eloquently, and perhaps I may be allowed to add, more pompously; but I am on certain ground, which I could justify by unlimited quotations, when I claim that their general outlook upon the nascent science to which they contributed so much genius and so much hope, was of the kind which I have indicated. Optimists they undoubtedly were. All pioneers have been. No pioneers have ever brought more enthusiasm to a more tangled and more hopeless jungle.

Twenty-five years ago, I wrote a small work upon the subject of international law, in which

I attempted a definition of that science. To-day it would be necessary that I should rewrite it. To-day I should define international law as that body of doctrine which civilized nations, until quite recently, had believed to be binding upon them with a force and authority comparable to that which in their own systems is conceded to their own law. This definition, of which I sorrowfully record my own conviction that it is neither cynical nor pessimistic, suggests some sombre observations. Hundreds of years have passed since the great pioneers addressed themselves to a Herculean task—hundreds of years of Christianity and civilization; and yet to-day the cruel and poignant truth confronts him who cares to understand the truth that the Great War very nearly demonstrated the moral bankruptcy of that system which had been laboriously and painfully compiled by the humanitarian and intellectual effort of centuries.

The most familiar and elementary weakness of international law had, of course, always been that it formally recognized in war a permitted system of litigation. Implicit in this recognition

was that the result of such a war, whatever its moral quality, involved, even if by usurpation, the function of the Judge. And accordingly, a nation which put its quarrel to the hazard of the sword established its legal, as apart from its moral, position by its successful employment. This was the reason which led the cynical, unscrupulous, but powerful mind of Bismarck to pour constant contempt upon international law and its professors. "Find me an argument founded upon international law," he cried, "and I will find you a professor to answer it." And so the nation which worshipped in the world of abstract thought Treitschke, and in the world of action Bismarck, grew intelligibly contemptuous of a creed which perforce admitted that success constituted immorality. And so too there arose in Europe a Power calculating, reckless, unscrupulous, which laughed at the Hague Conferences while it attended them; which looked only to the sharpness of its sword and to the disciplined strength of its great battalions.

In the year 1914, all those who counted intellectually and politically in Germany were secretly

laughing at international law and at all which it involved. And the tragic commentary cannot be omitted that the inherent and unavoidable weakness of this body of doctrine almost justified them in the view which they took. For had Germany won the war what would have happened? She would have dictated peace, I should imagine, at Buckingham Palace; for the *réclame* of this *mise-en-scène* would, on the whole, have been greater than that of Versailles. And, anyhow, she had enjoyed this once already. She would have rewritten on a new map the outlines of a new world. And all this she would have done with complete impunity. And, inasmuch as the strong have many friends, she would have found apologists and defenders in every neutral country of the world. She would have conquered by the agency of poison gas; by sinking hospital ships; by breaking almost every hitherto observed convention of war; by converting the sea into a maelstrom of murder; and by a public deification of the doctrine of dreadfulness. The triumph of Germany, in other words, would have involved the destruction and the dis-

ruption of international law as the whole world had understood that law until the month of August, 1914.

But Germany did not win the war. Through all those dark and doubtful months we had sustained ourselves by the belief that the defeat of Germany would mark the downfall of an outlook upon public law at once so unmoral and so destructive. Has it done so? Can any dispassionate observer, examining with cool survey the present outlook of the world, claim that the authority of international law is as strong to-day as it was in 1914? Central Europe is dissolving before our eyes into anarchy. It would exceed the purpose of this argument to analyse and determine the responsibility. We are more concerned to appraise facts than to distribute praise or blame. And the facts, however disillusioning, stare us in the face. Every nation which, under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, has obtained less than that to which it conceived itself entitled, is simply waiting an opportunity to get more. Nearly every vital preclusion of the various Hague Conferences was violated in the Great

War; and no step has been taken, or can very easily be taken, for restoring that which, for want of a better term, I must describe as their authority. The late Mr. Hall, in a preface to the last edition but one, of his learned and sagacious work upon the subject of international law, indulged in a gloomy prediction, which events have very fully justified. He predicted that the next war would be fought with a degree of unscrupulous savagery which had not been known since the Middle Ages. He was right.

If we could persuade ourselves that the defeat of Germany, the principal employer of those methods, had ended them for ever, the mischief, in point of time, would be finite, and in point of consequence curable. But, unhappily, we have no such security. It is, on the whole, worth while to face facts, however disagreeable and naked those facts may be. And the truth is that when the nations of the world spring to arms, when the glittering counter of world-dominion is placed at the hazard, all the boasted veneer of our civilization is swiftly dissipated, and we still revert, as man reverted long ago, to the state of

society which Mr. London so vividly portrayed in his book "Before Adam." Does any sane person now believe that, if another war should ever emerge, a nation which sees victory or defeat depending almost upon the throw of a coin, will neglect any instrument of destruction, however devastating, the employment of which promises success and all that success brings? And indeed, I myself have always thought that the nice distinctions drawn by various Hague Conferences between permissible and non-permissible instruments of destruction were so artificial that they could not support the harsh test of modern warfare.

Let me give an illustration, in order to see precisely where international law stands to-day. The unlimited submarine warfare carried on by Germany did as much to brand her with indelible infamy as any crime which she committed. Germany was defeated, and her fleet lies rusting in the green depths of Scapa Flow. With her defeat it might have been supposed that the judgment of the whole world had been finally, and for all time, delivered upon a method of warfare

so inhumane and so murderous. Has it? Are we sure to-day that, if a world war broke out to-morrow in which this country was involved, the same submarine weapon would not be employed to our hurt? Is it not, on the contrary, a fact that every competent Admiralty in the world is at this moment preparing its plans upon the basis that the German menace will be renewed, if not by Germany, then by another? How are we, then, who, up to the present, have counted ourselves as writers and authorities on international law, to describe the legality of submarine warfare? Are we to say that it is legal or that it is illegal? And if we pronounce it to be illegal; are we, none the less, to proceed upon the basis that it will be recurrent; and that we must guard against it or perish?

A further illustration may be attempted. The last war ushered in the employment of poison gases. In comparison with the physical consequences of many gases, actual and potential, the nice refinements of the Hague Conferences become obsolete; and, if the subject were not too tragical, they would also become humorous.

What are the chemists of the disappointed nations doing at this moment? Are they caring about the Hague Conferences of the past or the Hague Conferences of the future? Is there any particular form of chemical horribleness from which Germany would recoil if she could destroy the French Army of Occupation on the Ruhr? Are we quite sure in the Temple of Truth from what weapons we should ourselves recoil if we were Germans, and the French were in occupation, and perhaps not a merely temporary occupation, of the Ruhr? Have even the most skilful chemists finally exploited the destructive effects of new chemicals? Are new Hague Conferences to continue to proscribe expansive bullets, and register preclusions upon the use of chemicals which hardly any nation in the world has any intention of obeying?

I am fully conscious that the whole tenor of my observations is one of gloomy presage to the future of civilization; but my counsel, such as it is, has no value if it be not frankly and honestly given. There was, indeed, a dream, affording to sanguine minds the prospect of a golden hope,

when President Wilson held out the assurance that the United States of America would adhere to a League of Nations which might have made international law a reality by arming its prescriptions with a sanction. I myself, unfortunately, have not a sanguine mind; or at least not an oversanguine one, and I never for one moment believed that President Wilson would be successful in inducing the American people to undertake responsibilities alien to its traditions, and only with great difficulty to be reconciled with its interests. And, accordingly, I incurred no small degree of censure by directing attention, in an address which I delivered to the New York Bar Association in the year 1918, to the difficulties which, principally from the American point of view, seemed to me to make its adoption difficult, if not impossible. Unhappily, my premonitions were justified. I wish that my critics had been right and I had been wrong. But I knew then very clearly that I was right and that they were wrong. And therefore I submitted myself to their censures with very great composure.

Who, for instance, with the claim to be still

at large, could have supposed that the United States of America would have submitted to the League of Nations for imperative decision the question of Japanese immigration in her Western provinces? It is a very noble thing to be an idealist; but it is, on the whole, more useful to be a realist. If the League of Nations had been practicable, in the sense that the United States of America would have done everything necessary to make it a success—in the sense, to be more precise, that the United States of America would have contributed their share of the military and naval force necessary to enforce its decisions—a fair opportunity would at least have been given to a dazzling experiment. Then, and then only, might international law have become law in the only sense in which any law is law. But even so, I hesitate, while I would have welcomed the experiment, to predict with complete conviction that it would have succeeded. Would immunity, even so, have been attainable in any grave decision which required instruments of coercion? And, in a supreme clash of nations and of interests, would anything else have happened

except that a new world war would have developed with alignments differently, but not less dangerously, defined?

My conclusions, therefore, though sombre, are, I believe, sensible and cautious. Mankind is a combative animal. The world still holds precious and incalculable prizes for those who have the will to conquer and the manhood to die. Nations will still be found willing to put all to the hazard; men will still be found in those nations willing to die. And so the survival of the fit and the elimination of the unfit will still proceed; and all that we, who call ourselves international lawyers, can hope to do is to carry in hands less puissant the torch of Grotius; and preach to an indifferent world the creed that in the long run violence and illegality do not pay; that, to a nation, the white escutcheon of unsullied morality is as priceless as to an individual; and that the Sermon on the Mount was not the idle chatter of a thoughtless Man.

IDEALISM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

CHAPTER VII

IDEALISM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS[1]

IDEALISM may be defined, as well as in another way, by calling it the spirit which impels an individual or group of individuals to a loftier standard of conduct than that which ordinarily prevails around him or them. This definition does not, of course, impinge upon the philosophical concept of idealism that in external conceptions the objects immediately known are ideas; that, in other words, all reality is in its nature psychical. With such abstractions (though they are of great interest) we are not practically at this moment concerned.

Idealism in the international field is the spirit which would carry into the relations of States the kind of ethical progress generally indicated above.

Now it is evident that every sane and normal citizen must desire improvement in the standards

[1] Rectorial address, Glasgow University, November, 1923.

of purity and morality. Nor is it less evident that every reasonable statesman must desire that the relationship between States shall be increasingly regulated in accordance with the highest attainable standards of conscientious conduct. Conflict, therefore, is very unlikely to arise so long as attention is confined to the larger generalizations which the term suggests. The subject, however, of this observation is naturally neither an attempt to examine nor appraise the value either in national or international affairs of a loftier standpoint; or of a more austere ethical outlook. Such abstract discussion would be one-sided; nor would it lend itself to any fruitful disputation.

It is when attention is directed to the sharply contrasted views of those who are distinguished in political matters as " Idealists " or " Realists," that the subject-matter of the present examination becomes apparent. The use of these discordant terms makes it plain that the word " Idealism " is employed in current phraseology to indicate a point of view in relation to life which may be challenged without either absurdity or cynicism.

No one, for instance, imagines that the school of political thought which is conveniently described as Realistic would impeach the conception or definition of Idealism with which this address began. The term, therefore, is used in a narrower or more specialized sense, which must be somewhat more carefully analysed.

In current language an idealist in this sense is one who places before himself in private or public affairs as attainable, a goal which other citizens, perhaps equally moral, do not believe to be so attainable. Provided that the idealist be a sound judge of moral valuations nothing but good can proceed from his admonitions. If he wrenches, in his individual exertions, even a tiny fragment from the area of a grosser world, he will not perish without the glory of achievement.

It has, of course, naturally happened that the greatest of idealists have been teachers or preachers. And of all such, Jesus Christ was evidently the most pre-eminent. But it would be unreasonable to suppose that when He admonished him who was assaulted to turn the other cheek to the smiter; or him who was rich to sell

all his possessions, and give them to the poor, He was laying down standards of conduct which He either expected or desired to see generally adopted. He was, on the contrary, diffusing through the medium of metaphor a sweet and beautiful moral atmosphere for the purification of imperfect manhood. Were an autocrat to issue a ukase within his own dominions ordering all rich men to divest themselves of their possessions in favour of the poor; he would be, assuming morality of purpose, an idealist in the narrower sense, but he would also be an idealist in that more aggressive and dangerous connotation, with which we are principally concerned.

An analysis of the subject derives some guidance from the use of the term in private, as opposed to public, policy. For such an examination makes it plain how small has been the conquest of Idealist thought, even over the comparatively easy domain of individual conduct. The school of Idealism is the very antithesis of the school of self-interest. And yet nothing is more apparent than that politically, economically, and philosophically the motive of self-interest not

only is, but must be, and ought to be, the mainspring of human conduct. Bentham long since pointed out in his " Theory of Legislation," how inconvenient and even mischievous the consequences would be if every individual were to regulate his conduct, not in relation to his own interests, which he is likely to understand, but in relation to the interests of others, in relation to which he is very likely to be imperfectly informed.

Economically the matter is not less plain. Mankind subsists precariously upon this globe on the terms of constant and contributory toil. The experience of thousands, perhaps of hundreds of thousands of years, has shown that the desire of self-advancement is the only adequate incentive for that standard of labour and achievement which each individual must be encouraged in the common scheme to afford. The only legitimate sphere, therefore, of the idealist within the field of private morality is to elevate, if he can, the standards by reference to which conduct is, in the existing scheme of things, adjusted, without attempting to impair motives which are funda-

mental in human nature, and vital to social economy.

If we turn to the relationship of States we shall find it necessary to draw similar distinctions even more clearly; for many causes combine in this field to contract the area with which altruism is likely to win adherence. The man who cries, "My country, right or wrong," may or may not be a patriot; but he is certainly not an idealist. The latter in this connexion must again be conceived of not merely as one who desires to see the substitution in international practice of Law for War: the complete purification of international morality; and perhaps—

The Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.

For in this vague sentiment of benevolence many admirable citizens of many countries would concur. But the Idealist in the sense which concerns us is he who believes that these things are in fact attainable; that we ought to take steps and make exertions, and even sacrifices, in order to attain them. And he would indeed, in most cases, actually shape the policy of his country,

and even compromise its interests, because he believes in the prospects which he indicates; and in the sanctity and infallibility of international compacts.

Twenty-four years ago a Tsar of Russia issued to the world a very sonorous and idealist message. It announced the hope that War might be for ever ended. It made specific proposals in that sense. And thus there came into existence a Hague Conference, with the history of which most of us are familiar. It would be foolish to deny that this Conference did some useful work in its secondary tasks—namely, the consideration of international disputes; and the alleviation of avoidable cruelty in the prosecution of war, which is itself in its very essence cruel. But it has achieved absolutely nothing in the direction of its major and more imposing purpose. In a book upon the subject of international law which I wrote immediately after the appearance of the Tsar's communication I made the following observation :

> No sensible person with the slightest knowledge of history will believe that human nature

has so profoundly altered as to afford the most remote prospect that this dream will ever be realized.

This conclusion was much assailed at the time by our sentimentalists. But a few years later that same Russia was hurling men in millions in the attempt to destroy Japan. And continuously thereafter the junta of evil and ambitious men, of whom the Kaiser was alike the mouthpiece and the figurehead, was projecting the stupendous tragedy which has almost, in its reactions, destroyed the civilization of Europe. Untaught by previous experience; undeterred by the shattering refutation of their beliefs which the Great War brought with it; the Idealists immediately had the originality to exploit its outbreak for their own controversial purposes. It was indeed unfortunate, they admitted, that the War should have occurred at all; and especially war so savagely conducted and flung over so enormous an area of the world's surface. But, after all, it had its bright side. For it was to be a war to end war. This time, at least, when once the

ploughshare, according to the correct tradition, had ousted the weapons of war, there was to be no further declension into primeval savagery. And so we were to have a League of Nations consisting in time of all the nations, great and small, in the world; equipped with military and naval force, and therefore able to make good its decisions against a recalcitrant member.

While I thought, and think, that there was, and still is, a modest area within which the League of Nations may make useful contribution to the harmony of the world; the larger claims made on its behalf always seemed to me to be frankly fantastic. Its framers forgot human nature as absurdly as they neglected history. What in the history of the world has ever happened which afforded foothold for expectations so megalomaniac? Divide the history of the world into two broad epochs, with the birth of Jesus Christ as the dividing line. An examination in terms, however general, of these two periods equips a scientific observer with some material for the formation of true decision. Of the earlier period first.

I do not pause to deal here with the countless

minor struggles which everywhere marked the infancy of the world. I mention, only to note it, the evidence collected by Darwin and his followers showing at work in every department of life the survival of the fittest. But I must bestow a moment upon the lessons to be derived from the Old Testament. According to Holy Writ the chosen people were set in motion in order that they might violently possess themselves of a land flowing with milk and honey. They are " utterly to destroy their enemies." And thereafter we find them over a long period of time, protracted no doubt by their own peccadilloes, engaged in violent and bloody strife with various antagonists. It may, of course, be said, in view of their desperate struggles with the Philistines, that the latter were very wicked men. Unfortunately, however, there always have existed in the world very wicked men.

Perhaps, therefore, it is necessary to import the qualification that all wars are to cease, except against very wicked men. But even here a difficulty presents itself. For every war that I know of has recurrently presented the same pheno-

menon that each protagonist believed, or pretended to believe, in the moral vileness of the other. In 1914, for instance, the French affirmed the Germans to be wicked aggressors; whereas the German people as a whole loudly proclaimed the criminal initiative of Russia.

It must, therefore, I think, be admitted that the history of the chosen people, and indeed the Old Testament, taken as a whole, afford little ground for optimism in this regard.

A similar but more extended observation falls to be made about all the great Eastern Empires of the ancient world. Indeed, in this connexion, sombre images throng the mind. Egyptians, Medes, Persians, Assyrians—all these achieved Empire at the point of the sword. Of how many dead Empires does the silent and immobile East contain the record? In what graves repose the millions of their unprotesting slain?

A happier and more humane experience might have been looked for from that exquisite intellectual efflorescence which we associate with the greatest of Greek States. Yet, historically, their records tell of almost continuous strife. So

bitterly indeed, and amid such jealousies, did they wage war with one another, that they could not combine even against the fierce Macedonian, and so one more rare and beautiful civilization perished utterly from the earth.

To Greece succeeded Rome, teaching the entire world through the whole of its stern, dominating, and Imperial sway, that might was right; and that a sharp sword in the hand of a disciplined soldier was the most persuasive argument in world diplomacy.

And there came, too, in correction, the message of Jesus Christ, tender in its simplicity, superhuman in its humanity. The creed of Him who was crucified was to spread with incredible swiftness over a large part of the world's surface. Mighty powers and great princes have rendered homage to the message of mercy and peace which came from those Divine and persuasive lips.

And yet, while we take note of the spread of the Christian religion; we must none the less analyse the value of its reaction upon international conduct. What was its influence over the recent world convulsion? What was its

spiritual and intellectual contribution to that poignant problem? Why did an omnipotent Deity suddenly doom so many innocent victims to bestial destruction? Did the greatest priest in the world, enthroned in his Roman Palace, ever pronounce a clear and intelligible conclusion upon the moral responsibility for the outbreak of war; or upon the methods by which that war was conducted? Was he influenced by the fact that his flock diverged beneath different standards? If so, he ceased to be the divinely appointed mouthpiece of the higher morality, and declined to a place, such as it was, among the politicians.

After a digression, apparently, rather than actually irrelevant, we may resume a hurried historical summary.

After Rome, the Barbarians; after the Barbarians countless decades of anarchical chaos. And then throughout the centuries a long succession of almost uninterrupted wars—wars dynastic; wars territorial; wars on points of honour; and wars of naked aggression. England and France; England and Spain; England and Holland; England and France again; France

and Germany; and thereafter the violent emergence of the Hohenzollern dynasty; more cynically based on blood and iron; more determined *debellare superbos*, than any Power since mighty Rome.

Are we really to learn nothing from all that has happened over this immense period of time? Does any warrant exist for the belief that human nature has altered its whole character? And, if so, what is the warrant? And when did that alteration take place? And, more particularly, what evidence of this great Reformation do we find in what has happened in Europe since the Armistice? There have been wars and rumours of wars. I do not myself know of a moment in the last four years in which there has appeared to be less prospect of permanent peace in Europe than at the present moment.

Nor is it an answer to say, as some do, that the infirmities of the Treaty of Versailles were responsible for the unrest and the violence which distract Europe to-day. If there were infirmities in that Treaty these again were infirmities in human nature which cannot be corrected. For the statesmen who put their names to that Treaty—

to the territorial readjustments of that Treaty —were themselves the mouthpieces of imperious and conquering democracies, and the views under discussion here are largely founded upon the expectation that the human nature of democracies will not undergo much modification. And if it does not they will obtain statesmen malleable to their purposes.

Summing up this branch of the matter, we are bound to conclude that from the very dawn of the world man has been a combative animal. To begin with, he fought violently for his own elemental needs; later, perhaps in tribal or communal quarrel; later still, with the growth of greater communities, upon a larger and more sophisticated scale. And it is to be specially noted that there have nevertheless almost always existed men who sincerely but very foolishly believed; firstly, that no war would arise in their own day; and, secondly (when that war did arise), that for some reason or other it would be the last. At this point the idealist degenerates into the pacifist; and it is at this point consequently that he becomes a danger to the community of which

he is a citizen. Athens, in her decline, had no lack of such advisers; and, unhappily for the City of the Violet Crown, she preferred their sloppy folly to the ardent eloquence of Demosthenes. In the days of Napoleon (who had a very just contempt for these "ideologues") Charles Fox harnessed his eloquence to the chariot of sentimentalism. But he switched rather abruptly as soon as he became Prime Minister. And in our own day we have been afforded convincing evidence of the real peril to national security which arises when idealists grow too strong in the conduct of public affairs. Perhaps this happened in 1906. Every sensible person now realizes that even in that year the German scheme was being nebulously conceived; and its deadly menace increased with every year which passed. I myself, in a book called "Unionist Policy," published in 1910, devoted a long article, of which I shall presume to say that it was closely and clearly reasoned, to demonstrating the soundness of Lord Roberts's warnings. But the immense increase in the German Army, the construction of strategic railways

upon the Belgian boundary; the creation of a mighty fleet, which had no enemy but ours, left our idealists unconvinced.

And accordingly, every year the annual meeting of a great federation, with pathetic faith and sincerity, passed resolutions in favour of reducing our military and naval expenditure; and a member of Parliament, in private life an admirable citizen and a sagacious chemist, produced the immortal saying that he would rather trust to the doctrines of international law than to the protection of the British Fleet.[1] Even the robust patriotism of my friend Mr. Winston Churchill succumbed for a fugitive moment to the miasma; though the lapse in his case was to be nobly retrieved by the demoniac energy elicited by actual contact with the Admiralty. It was, indeed, in these years that Idealism became rampant with those in power. Notorious and almost vital facts were everywhere ignored. German editors were entertained by English editors in London; and dilated with fluent eloquence upon the pacific intentions of the Father-

[1] Sir John Brunner.

land. English editors in their turn visited Berlin to enjoy, in that martial capital, the same agreeable reassurances. And all the time the armies grew. All the time a mighty instrument was being fashioned in the German fleet. All the time Heligoland frowned more impregnably upon the North Sea. All the time those great military railways, unneeded for peaceful traffic, were debouching upon the defenceless Belgian frontier. In the welter of sentimentality, amid which Great Britain might easily have mouldered into ruin, my valued colleague, Lord Haldane, presented a figure alike interesting, individual, and arresting. In speech fluent and even infinite, he yielded to no living idealist in the easy coinage of sentimental phraseology. Here, indeed, he was a match for those who distributed the chloroform of Berlin. Do we not remember, for instance, that Germany was his spiritual home? But he none the less prepared himself, and the Empire, to talk when the time came with his spiritual friends in language not in the least spiritual. He devised the Territorial Army, which was capable of becoming the easy nucleus

of national conscription; and which unquestionably ought to have been used for that purpose at the outbreak of war. He created the Imperial General Staff. He founded the Officers' Training Corps.

And two other names require special and honourable mention in an age of incredible self-deceit. Lord Roberts devoted the evening of an illustrious life to warnings of marvellous prescience which passed almost unheeded. General Baden-Powell used the laurels which he had gained at Mafeking to inspire and sustain the noblest and most promising movement which has taken place in our lifetime. The foundation of the Boy Scouts established for this gifted and imaginative soldier a monument more lasting than bronze.

It has been thought worth while to retrace the events of these fateful years with some particularity in order to show that Idealism in national affairs is not merely impracticable, but that it may easily degenerate into a deadly source of national peril.

Still a further illustration may be drawn from

recent events. The signing of the Armistice immediately released all the sentimentalists. Not only was the Great War ended, but there was never to be another. The League of Nations was to be equipped with functions and resources which would in effect enthrone it in super-sovereignty over the contributory nations. But herein the statesman who of all others should most completely have understood the American people demonstrated that in fact he understood them least of all. That people is the most generous people in the world in the field of international charity. The United States have lavished countless millions of dollars upon the starving population of Russia. They were first in the field with bountiful relief to stricken Japan. But they draw—and rightly draw—a sharp and logical distinction between Idealism in their capacity as private citizens for private charities; and Idealism in their corporate or national character. And accordingly they exercised their undoubted right in repudiating at the first opportunity an idealist conception which they believed to be at once impracticable, strange

to their traditions, and incompatible with their interests.

A broader consideration must now in its turn be examined. We are told that the object aimed at is the abolition of war. Everybody recognizes that war is both cruel and hateful. But is it even conceivable that it can ever be abolished? Is the ownership of the world to be stereotyped by perpetual tenure in the hands of those who possess its different territories to-day? If it is, very strange and undesirable consequences will one day follow. For nations wax and wane, so that a Power competent in one age to govern an empire, perhaps remote, in the general interest of the world, will in another abuse a dominion for which it no longer possesses the necessary degree of vigour. The history of Spain supplies a familiar illustration.

Her chivalry was second to none in Europe. Her high standard of gallant conduct was disfigured only by the cruelties of the Inquisition. Her stately galleons brought a quiver of apprehension even to the stout bosom of Queen Elizabeth; and were never discredited until the rout

of the superb Armada. And in exuberant colonial enterprise she was the mistress and pioneer of Europe. In the last-named enterprise, indeed, she flung her civilization and her language into the remote parts of the world, deriving incredible titles from successive Papal Bulls. And coincidently, or almost so, with her immense maritime enterprise, she flung the martial Moor in rout from Spain. But her decline was as rapid as her ascension. She proved no adequate custodian of her oversea possessions. Had a League of Nations existed when she began to lose them, would it have sustained Spain, or the insurgents of Spain, or in another case, the despoilers of Spain?

And the general extrusion of savage races from regions, for instance, the American continent, and certain of the South Sea Islands, to which they had some considerable legal right, shows that, rightly or wrongly, nations of stronger fibre, confronted by indigenous weaklings, have always asserted the right of forcible expropriation. No one (to make the argument short) who has studied the history of the world has ever

defended the view that the supreme interest of evolutionary humanity can support a definitive delimination for all time of the surface of the world.

But if such a final distribution is impracticable and even undesirable, by what agency are modifications to be made? Voluntary cessions of territory have not been frequent in the past; and there seems little reason to suppose that they will become more fashionable in the future. For many thousands of years the emergence of new and martial nations has been gradually marked by violent readjustments of national boundaries. It may, of course, be the case that human nature has so completely altered that some new method is discoverable. I confess, however, that none has up to the present occurred to my own mind.

It may, perhaps, be charged against those who sincerely hold the views which I have attempted to make plain, that we carry in our veins the virus which coloured the sombre and unmoral genius of Treitschke, and which found popular expression in the mosquito propaganda of von

Bernhardi. But such a charge, if made, would be patently unjust. We neither hold nor have we preached these doctrines. We diagnose certain diseases. We did not create them. A distinction must surely be drawn between him who calls attention to the risk of conflagration and that other who puts his torch to inflammable material.

The purpose and moral of these general observations may be summarized in a few concluding observations. For as long a time as the records of history have been preserved human societies passed through a ceaseless process of evolution and adjustment. This process has been sometimes pacific; but more often it has resulted from warlike disturbance. The strength of different nations, measured in terms of arms, varies from century to century. The world continues to offer glittering prizes to those who have stout hearts and sharp swords; it is therefore extremely improbable that the experience of future ages will differ in any material respect from that which has happened since the twilight of the human race. It is for us, therefore, who in our

history have proved ourselves a martial, rather than a military, people to abstain, as has been our habit, from provocation; but to maintain in our own hand the adequate means for our own protection; and, so equipped, to march with heads erect and bright eyes along the road of our Imperial destiny.

INDEX

PAGE

Abolition of slavery 13
Addison, Dr. 86
Address to Williamstown Institute 103
Admiralty, the German viii
Agricultural pressure in politics 10
Agriculture in America 112
Alcohol, certification of 57
Allied cause, the 37
victory of 107
Alsace-Lorraine 121
America, advancement of 10
agricultural situation in 9, 112
constitution of 135
industrial genius of xv
naval force of 173
negro problem in 11, 139
universities of 44
Ancestry, British, in America 27
Anglo-American relations vii
Anglo-Saxon characteristics 140, 142
Apple-jack 60
Armada, the Spanish 198
Armistice, signing of 196
Arms, strength of 41
Asquith, Mr. 146, 151
Assyrians 187
Athens 192
Austin 159
Australia 91

Baden-Powell, General Sir R. 195
Baldwin, Mr. Stanley... 36
Bar, the English 77
Bar Association, Canadian... 159
of New York 171

Index

PAGE

Barbarians, The 189
Bay of Fundy 81
Beer, in relation to prohibition 63
"Before Adam" 168
Belgium 118
judges of 50
Bentham, Jeremy 108
his "Theory of Legislation" 181
Berlin ... ...x, 105
Bernhardi 200
Birkenhead, Earl of, in America 103, 135
at Glasgow 177
in Canada 159
on constitutionalism 135
on the French occupation 123
on House of Lords 148
on idealism 177
on international law 159
on Irish questions 32
on negro problem 11
on President Wilson ... vii, 17, 24, 107, 171
on prohibition 49
on unemployment 127
personal experiences ... 26, 35, 44, 58, 77
references to earlier American visit ... vii, 17
Birmingham 26
Bismarck, Prince 164
Bootlegging ... ... 59 *et seq.*
Borrowed money, interest on 112
Boy Scouts 195
British Cabinet of 1914 xi
British flag, the 95
British fleet, the 193
Brunner, Sir John 193
Bryce, Viscount 135
Buckingham Palace 165
Budget, balancing of British 115
Bullets, expansive 170
Burke, Edmund 85

Index

PAGE

CABINET, British, of 1914 xi
of British Empire 153
California 61
Cambridge 3
Canada and America 97
a land of incalculable promise 80
cities of 99
imports to U.K. 92
military records of 98
position in Empire 94
Canadian Bar Association, address to 159
Division, the 95
National Line... 78
Pacific Line 78
soldiers, valour of 97
trade 93
Carlton Restaurant, London 73
Carson, Lord 35
Certification of alcohol 57
Championship, Golf 43
Charon 5
Chatham, Lord 28
Chemicals, chemists 170
Chicago 13, 41, 42
Christ Church, Oxford 3
Christianity 109, 163
spread of 188
Chromite 81
Churchill, Mr. Winston 193
Cities of Canada 99
Clemenceau 22
Climate of America 41
Coalition Government 151
Cobden, Richard 7
Coercion, international 161
Cohen, patronymic of xviii
Collins, Mr. Mike 38
Colonial Conference 87
Colonial enterprise of Spain 197
Colonies, the American 28

Index

PAGE

Coloured attendants 14
Combativeness 191
Conscription 195
Conservative Government, the 152
Party 151
Constitution, the American 136
"a cast-iron document" 139
Constitutionalism ... ... 135 *et seq.*
Conversion of paper money 128
Copper in Canada 81
Corsica, a comparison with 33
Cosgrave, President 39
Cravath, Mr. Paul D. v
Creed of Jesus Christ 188
Crown cases in prize... xiv
Crown Prince Wilhelm 106
Currency, German 129

DARWIN, CHARLES 186
Daughter-states within the Empire 99
David, King 51
Debates and discussions, importance of 103
Debts, payment of 116
"the scars of war"... 120
Defeat of Germany 168
Deflation 15
Degeneracy and idealism 191
Democracy in Britain 141
Democratic Party 23
Demosthenes 192
De Valera, Mr. 39
Dicey, Professor 141
Directory, the New York 31
Disabilities, constitutional 151
Discussion, abstract 178
Disraeli 142, 155
Dominions, political importance of British 154
Dublin 35
Duff, Mr. Justice v
Dynasty, the Hohenzollern 190

Index

PAGE

EAST, the immobile 187
Eastern coast of America 43
Economic systems considered 114, 181
Educated Americans 32
Edward VII, King 156
Egyptians 187
Elimination of the unfit 173
Elizabeth, Queen ... ... xvii, 197
Efflorescence of Greek States 187
Electorate, uncontrolled power of British 144
Eloquence of Demosthenes 192
Emigration 32
Empire, the British 152
Empire Markets 93
Employers and Prohibition 57
Endowments, mediæval 3
Enforcement of Prohibition 58
England, unemployment in 127
English Bar, the 77
Ethical progress 177
Europe ... ... xiii, 9, 21, 119, 160
America and non-intervention 23
anarchy in 166
challenge to, by Germany ... 184
condition of 127, 190
interest of 131
problems in 103
responsibility of U.S. to 25
stagnation in 93
European politics 9, 11, 160, 167
European society, structure of 106
Evolution and adjustment 200
Example, the German 165
Exchanges 113
Expansive bullets 170
Export trade of America 111
Exports of whisky 73

FACTORIES of America 8
Fanatical teetotalism 69

Index

PAGE

Fascisti movement 143
Federal authorities and prohibition 60
"Federation of the world" 182
Feldspar 81
Fire wastage in Canada 86
Fiscal independence 89
Fisheries of Canada 81
Fitzgerald, Edward 51
Fleet, the British 193
the German 168
"Flyvver" cars 41
Ford cars 41
Foreign Office, the British 154
Forests, Canadian 86
Fox, Charles 192
France 115
policy in the Ruhr 122
position of French citizens 128
Freedom of seas ... ... ix, xiv
Free-traders 7
Friendship with America 31
Fundy, Bay of 81

Gas, Poison 169
Generosity of Americans 77
Genius of American constitution 137
Genius, commercial, of peoples 112
George III, King 27
George V, King 155
George, Mr. Lloyd 36
Germany
conception of war scheme 192
docility and intelligence of xviii
editors entertained in England 193
indebtedness of 15
reparations from 120-127
responsibility of 125
Gladstone, Mr. 142
his Irish policy 35
Glasgow, Rectorial Address at 177

Index

PAGE

Gold 113
accumulation of 111
Canadian resources in 80
possession of, in America 10
Golf-courses in America 43
Government, American 110
British 29, 34, 146, 156
Lord Birkenhead as Minister of xiii
Coalition 151
shops in Canada 67
Grapes, Californian 61
Graphite 81
Gray's Inn ... ... v, 135
Great Britain xiii, 3, 26, 28, 29, 65, 93, 120, 124, 135, 194
American friendship for xviii
character of nation 117
democracy in 141
manufacturing genius of 113
nature of constitution 140
Great War of 1914 ... ... 21, 50, 103, 153, 166, 194
attitude of America xii
Dominion of Canada in 79, 98
intervention of U.S. ... ... xvi, 110
origin of 105
Greece 188
Greek States, the greatest 187
Griffith, Mr. Arthur 38
Grotius 160
the torch of 173
Gypsum 81

Hague Conferences 164, 166, 170, 172
Haldane, Lord 194
Hall, the late Mr. 167
Halsbury, Lord 5
Hardie, Mr. Keir 145
Heligoland 194
High Judges 71
High tariff systems 111
Hohenzollern Dynasty 190

Index

PAGE

Holland 189
Holy Writ 186
Home Rule 35
Homer 45, 98
Hospitality of America 43
House of Lords ... ... 148 *et seq.*
Hughes, Mr., Prime Minister of Australia 154
Hughes, Secretary 127
Humanitarian effort 163

IDEALISM ... ... 108, 177 *seq.*
"Ideologues" 192
Immigration 37
Japanese, in western provinces 172
Imperial Connexion, the 94
Imperial General Staff 195
Importation of wine-makers 61
Independent Labour Party 146
Indian, the indigenous 11
Industry, a new American 69
Inquisition, the 197
Inspiration, literal 52
Instruments of coercion 172
Inter-imperial trade 88
International Law, Address on 159
Ireland 27, 34
Italy 61, 118, 120

JAPAN 184, 196
Jesus Christ 51, 179, 185, 188
Judges of Belgium 50
Junta in Germany 184

KAISER WILHELM II 184
Knight-errancy 109
Kronje 97

LABOUR, the standard of 181
Party 148
Labrador 81

Index

PAGE

Lakes, the great 82
Law, Mr. Bonar 36
Law in Great Britain 141
international, addresses on 159
Lead, abundant in Canada 81
League of Nations 18, 24, 185
Legislation," "Theory of, Bentham's 181
Lewis, Mr. Sinclair 44
Liberal Party 91
Light wines 65
Liquor, smuggling of 62
Liverpool 26
Lloyd George, Mr. 36
London 21
London, Mr. Jack 168
Lords, House of 148-150

MacDonald, Mr. Ramsay... 146
Macedonian, "the fierce" 188
Mafeking 195
"Main Street" 45
Maine, Sir Henry 159
Majesty of law 72
Manchester 26
Manufacturing genius of America 113
Martial nations 200
Massachusetts 103
Mayflower, the 26
Medes 187
Mexico ... ... xi, 59
Mica 81
Middle Ages, the 167
Middle West, farmers of 111
Milton 30
Mining industry in Canada 81
Minorities and prohibition 69
Misrule, Turkish 16
Monarchy in Britain 142, 154
Montreal 58
Morality 73

Index

PAGE

Motor-cars in America 42
Mount, Sermon on the 173
"My American Visit" 49

NAPOLEON 192
Nations, League of 18, 185
Navy, the British 96
Negro problem 11, 139
New England architecture 86
New York Bar Association 171
Nickel, Canadian export of 81
Noah 50
North American States 13
North, Lord 6, 27
North Sea, the 194
North and South of Ireland 35

OCCUPATION of the Ruhr 123, 170
Officers' Training Corps 195
Optimism 162
Oxford 3

PACIFISTS 191
Pact of Protection 22
Palace Yard, Westminster 146
Palmerston, Lord 155
Papacy, the, and politics 189
Papal Bulls 198
Paper currency... 122
Paris 21
"Parliament of Man" 182
Peace 131, 188
Treaty of 166
Persians 187
Philistines 186
Poincaré, M. Henri 15
Poison gas 169
Poisoned alcohol 57
Police in America 59
Pope, the ... ... ix, 189

Index

PAGE

Population of Canada 86
Preferences 90
Prerogatives of House of Lords 150
Private morality 181
Prize, Crown cases in xiv
Prizes, hearts, and swords 200
Progress, possibility of 161
Prohibition ... ... 49 *et seq.*
Propaganda, of the author vii
of von Bernhardi 200
Proposals of President Wilson 23
Prosperity of United States 7
Protection 9, 91
Provinces, Northern, of Ireland 35
Psalmist, the 51
Public Schools of America... 27
Pyrites 81

Queen Elizabeth ... ... xvii, 197
Queen Victoria 155-6
Queenstown xiv

Racial influence, Irish 37
Railway attendants 14
Rectorial address, Glasgow 177
Reform Bill 142
Reparations 120, 127
Representation and taxation 28
Republican Party 24
Repudiation of President Wilson 17
Responsibilities, American 171
Reverence for law 73
Risks of bootlegging 62
Roberts, Lord 192, 195
Rocky Mountains 84
Roman law ix
Rome 188, 190
Ruhr, the 123, 127, 170
Russia 122, 184, 187, 196

Index

PAGE

St. Lawrence, Gulf of 81
Saloons in America 54
Sanctions of law 171
Savings Bank deposits 71
Scandinavia 31, 96
Scapa Flow 168
Scotch whisky 58, 73
Seas, freedom of xiv
Securities, German transfer of 15
Self-interest 180
Sermon on the Mount 173
Servile conditions in America 12
Settlers in Ireland 34
Shakespeare ... ... xviii, 30
Shaughnessy, Lord 79
Shipping 112
Silver, Canadian resources in 81
Sinclair Lewis, Mr. 44
Slave trade 11
Smallness of England 32
Smith, patronymic of xviii
Smuggling 62
Social economy 182
Socialist movements 142-151
Sociology in Britain 145
Socratic dialogues, inspiration of 103
Solutions by debate 103
Somersetshire 26
South African War 97
South Ireland 33
South Sea Islands 198
Southern States of America 12
Sovereign power in Great Britain 155
Spain 189
Strife in ancient Greece 187
Submarines ... ... xi, 169
Subsistence of mankind, precarious 181
Supreme Court of U.S.A. 135
Sway, Imperial, in Rome 188

Index

PAGE

Talc 81
Tariffs 88, 90, 111
Teetotalism 69
Tenements of Chicago 13
Tennyson, quoted 182
Territorial Army 194
Testament, the New 52
the Old 50, 51
Textbooks in schools of America 27
"Theory of Legislation," Bentham's 181
Thornton, Sir Henry 78
Threadneedle Street 10
"Tibbet's Town" 45
Traditions, American 171
Tragic history of Ireland 34
Transfers of capital 128
Travelling activities 41
Treaty of Versailles 190
Treitschke, Heinrich 164
Tribal quarrels 191
Truth, Temple of 170
Tsar, the 183
Turkish misrule 16

Ulster 36
Uncontrolled power in Britain 141
Unfit, elimination of 173
Unionist Policy 192
United Kingdom and imports 92
United States ... ... xvii, 3, 11, 26, 32, 40, 49, 135
Canadian contact with 88
constitutionalism in 135
friendship with Great Britain 31
immense resources of 111
Irish influences 32
negro problem in 11, 139
President Wilson's policy in 17, 171
prohibition in 49
social life of 40
tributes to Great Britain 115

Index

PAGE

Universities 3, 44
Usurpation 164

VANCOUVER 99
Versailles 165
treaty of 190
Victoria (Canada) 99
Victoria, Queen 155-6
Volstadt Act 63
Von Bernhardi 199
Vote, the Irish 33

WALL STREET 4
War 106, 164, 173, 182, 197
crucible of 153
War of 1914 ... ... vii, 9, 79, 103, 143, 195
Washington ... ... viii, 9
Wastage, Canadian 86
Water turned into wine 51
Wealth, mineral, of Canada 80
Wellington, Duke of 142
Whisky traffic 58, 73
White House xii
Wilhelm II, Kaiser 184
Wilhelm, Crown Prince 106
Williamstown, Address at 103
Wilson, President ... ... vii, 17, 24, 107, 171
Wine 67
Wine-makers, importation of 61
Winnipeg 79
Women and prohibition 64
Working-classes and prohibition 56

YPRES, Second battle of 95

ZINC, Canadian 81

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